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Examining a Comparative Law Myth: 
Two Hundred Years of Riparian 
Misconception 
Andrea B. Carroir 
Jn this Article, Andrea B. Carroll inquires whether npan'ans on a nonnavigable lake 
(J)have mutual n'ghts to access the entire surface of the lake or, rather, (2)merely have the 
limited n'ght to access the portion of the surface overlying the bed they respectively own 
Canvll observes that the resolution of this question depends almost entirely on the state in wh1d1 
the parties litigate and that most Anlen"can junsdictions use one of two approaches: the so­
called "common law approach" or the so-called "civz1 law approach." Ca/Toll argues that coUJ1s 
that accept the distinction between the common law and the civil law approaches are 
perpetuating a false choice, because the "ciVJ1 law role" is not actually a role of the civzl law at 
all. It is, instead, the relatively modem and spontaneous generation ofone Europeanjurisdktion 
in response to peculiar policy choices. 'JJze role of civil law is exactly the same as that of the 
common law; indeed, the common law role has civilian roots. Carroll /Urther asseJts that the 
United States Supreme CoUJ1 made an error of interpretation over one hundred years ago that 
brought this distorted distinction into Amen'can junsprudence and that courts throughout the 
cowitry have perpetuated the error. In this Article, Carroll demonstrates that there are not. in 
fact, diveigent civil and common Jaw mies of npanan access, and she encourages courts to 
change the nomenclature to correct the persistent error. 
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[T]hc great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie­
dclibcrate, contr ived, and dishonest-but the myth­
pcrsistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.1 
The purported differences between the common and civil law 
systems are legendary. Battles have raged for centuries on both 
academic and political fronts over these differences. Hostilities have 
grown so intense that complete censorship once took hold; the study of 
I. Commencement Address at Yale University, PUB. PAPERS 470 (June 11, 1962) <speech of President John F. Kennedy). 
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the civil law, particularly Roman law, for example , was once banned in 
England.2 Even today, in "mixed jurisdictions" such as Louisiana and 
Quebec-heavily influenced by the Anglo-American common law, yet 
with a largely "civilian" body of private law3-wars are being waged by 
various groups to prevent further perceived intrusion by foreign 
systems.4 The parties involved in these disputes view the stakes as 
high. The differences between the common and civil law systems are 
perceived to be so great that acceptance by a staunch believer of one 
system of the other's validity or desirability is nearly inconceivable. 
The reality as we move further into the twenty-first century, though, is 
that the two systems are coming together much more closely. Many of 
the supposed differences between them-particularly that they involve 
diametrically opposed substantive rules-are mere myths. 
A pertinent example of such a myth has presented itself recently. 
Specifically, this long-debated question of the degree to which the 
common and civil law systems differ has come to a head on an issue 
relating to water rights. That water presents itself as a battleground 
here is perhaps not too surprising; waters and fighting have long been 
closely associated.5 One need only glance at etymology to understand 
the pervasiveness of the connection. The words "rivals" and "rivalry" 
are derivatives of ancient words relating to waters , specifically, the 
Roman word "n·ve," which referred to riparian landowners.6 Fifteen 
centuries have not brought much change; use of rivers and lakes 
remains a hotly contested issue. Professional anglers participating in 
fishing tournaments have been shot at by angry riparian landowners in 
both Alabama and Louisiana. 1 And a new controversy is currently 
2. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 302 
(5th ed., Little Brown & Co. 1956) (1929). 
3. See T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed 
Jun'sdictions': in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 10 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 
1965). 
4. See Jose Trias Monge, Legal Methodology in Some Mixed Jurisdictions, 78 TuL. 
L. REV. 333, 333 (2003); William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law 
(Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REv. 677, 737-38 (2000) . 
. 
s. Mark Twain is even claimed to have remarked, "Whisky's fer drinkin', water's fer 
fightm."' But see John R. Brown, "Miskys fer Drinkin'; ffilter8 fer Fightin'!" Is It? 
Resolving a Collective Action Dilemma in New Mexico, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 185, 186 n.3 
(2003) (questioning the propriety of the attribution). 
6. See Samuel C. Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of 
U'lltercoU1Ses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. 245, 255 n.46 ( 1918); 
see also ROMAN WATER LAW 90 (Eugene F. Ware trans., 3d ed. 1985) (defining "rivals" as 
''two persons who lead water through the same channel" (quoting DIG. 43.20.1.26 (Ulpian, 
Edict, bk. 70))). 
7. See Sports Briefs, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Jan. 7, 2004, at SD; Shooting 
Shocks BASS Angler, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 4, 2004, at Bl .  
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brewing in courts across the nation among riparian landowners that 
purportedly involves both the common law and the civil law, and 
serves as an interesting context within which to study the true 
differences between the t wo systems. 
The question is essentially one of riparian access to water for 
nonconsumptive purposes. In other words, do riparian landowners8 on 
a nonnavigable lake have mutual rights to access the entire. surface of 
the lake for fishing and boating, or are they limited to accessing that 
portion of the surface overlying bed they own?9 The resolution of this 
question depends almost entirely on the state in which the parties 
litigate. Most American jurisdictions that have considered the question 
have chosen one of t wo approaches: the so-called "common law 
approach" or the so-called "civil law approach." 
The truth is that these courts are perpetuating a false choice. In 
fact, the "civil law rule" adopted by at least six of our states' high 
courts is not actually a rule of the civil law at all. It is, instead, the 
relatively modem and spontaneous generation of one European 
jurisdiction in response to peculiar policy choices. The rule of civil 
law is exactly the same as that at common law; indeed, the so-called 
"common law rule" has civilian roots. But the United States Supreme 
Court made an error of interpretation over one hundred years ago that 
pulled a distorted rule into American jurisprudence and falsely 
attributed it to civilian sources. That error has been perpetuated by 
courts around the country ever since. 
The goal of this Article, then, is to demonstrate that there are not 
divergent civil and common law rules of riparian access. Part I will 
provide a brief example of the context that gives rise to the problem of 
riparian surface access to nonnavigable lakes for recreational or 
nonconsumptive purposes10 and then detail the two major divergent 
8. The word "littoral" more correctly applies to the description of property abutting 
a lake, while the word "riparian" technically refers only to property abutting rivers. IA 
GEORGE W THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 259, at 
311 (Replacement 1980). Nowadays, though, "riparian" is generally used to refer to both 
types of property. Id 
9. The issue is only controversial when its application is restricted to water bodies 
that state laws deem nonnavigable. In most states, waters that meet state definitions of 
navigability are open to public use. See A. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 85-87 (1984); 
DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsOURCES § 8 .28, at 8-45 to -52 (2002 & Supp. 
2005). If members of the general public are entitled to access and make nonconsumptive 
uses of the waters of these navigable bodies, a fortiori, riparian landowners may do the same. 
It is only ove� nonnav�gab.le waters, for which state law generally imposes no right of public use, that the nghts of npanan landowners to use water are questionable. 
1.0. .This Article �onsiders only the gulf between the two primary approaches to resolvmg disputes regarding nonconsumptive uses such as fishing, boating, swimming, and 
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approaches to solving this problem. Part II will then trace the history 
of the two approaches. It will demonstrate that the "civil law rule" is 
not, in fact, civilian at all; indeed, both the common and civil law rules 
came from the same source. Instead, the so-called "civil law rule" is a 
distortion that was imported into the United States erroneously and has 
· been perpetuated by our appellate courts for centuries. Finally, Part III 
will offer a proposal for changing the nomenclature, and most 
importantly, provide some observations about why it is important that 
courts and legal scholars correct this 200-year-old mistake. 
I. A TIMELY CONTEXT FOR REAPPRAISING THE DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW SYSTEMS 
A. The Problem of Surface Access to Nonnavigable ltater Bodies 
The Connecticut Supreme Court is the latest in a long string of 
state high courts to have decided a case that presents just the sort of 
controversy that spawned the historical error.11 Ace Eqwpment Sales, 
Inc. v. Buccino involved a dispute between two riparian owners on a 
nonnavigable lake. 12 The plaintiffs, including two recreational fishing 
clubs, were owners of ninety-nine percent of the bed of a twenty -acre 
manmade lake.13 They stocked the lake and used it for recreational 
fishing. 14 Defendants, the Buccinos, owned almost none of the bed of 
the lake, but owned the property on which the dam controlling the lake 
was erected. 15 After the Buccinos began granting permission to a fly 
fishing club to use the lake, the plaintiffs constructed a twelve-foot­
high fence along the lake's border.16 The intent was clearly to prevent 
use by the defendant-riparians. The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking an 
injunction to prevent the Buccinos and their guests from "trespassing" 
on the water.11 
bathing. There are significant divisions among jurisdictions in resolving questions of the 
entitlement of landowners to make consumptive uses of lakes, e.g., for irrigation. The 
doctrines adopted for those scenarios-most notably, the riparian landowner rights and prior 
appropriations doctrines-are discussed exhaustively elsewhere and are beyond the scope of 
this work. See, e.g., Joseph W Dellapenna, The Law of�ter Allocation in the Southeastem 
States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LiTILE ROCK L. REV. 9 (2002). 
11. See Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 637 (Conn. 2005). 
12. Id at 628. 
13. Id at 628-29. 
14. Id 
. 15. Id at 629. There was some dispute as to whether the Buccinos owned any portion of the lake bed at all. The Connecticut Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to 
resolve this factual question. Id at 637 n.14. 
16. Id at 629. 
17. Id 
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Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that because they owned nearly 
the entire bed of the lake, they were entitled to exclude others from the 
water overlying that bed.18 The Buccinos, in contrast, urged that their 
fellow riparian landowners on a nonnavigable lake had no right of 
ownership in the water and that, as owners of land abutting a lake, they 
were entitled to make recreational use of those waters, even when 
covering bed owned by another. 19 
The trial court ruled for the Buccinos, finding that "owners of 
land abutting a nonnavigable body of water have riparian or littoral 
rights that are not dependent on the genesis of the body of water as 
artificial or natural, or on the ownership of the subaqueous land."20 
The Connecticut appellate court agreed, f inding case law in Minnesota 
and Michigan instructive.21 Both Minnesota and Michigan allow all 
riparian owners to access the entirety of the surface of nonnavigable 
lakes, "provided such use is reasonable and does not unduly interfere 
with the exercise of similar rights on the part of other abutting owners 
. . regardless ... of the ownership of bed thereof."22 Thus, the 
plaintiffs were required to remove their fence and allow the Buccinos 
access.23 
In April 2005, though, the Connecticut Supreme Court rendered a 
decision reversing the trial and appellate court rulings and granting the 
plaintiffs the exclusive use of the waters above lakebed they own.24 It 
is this decision that highlights the controversy these facts present with 
regard to the differences between the common law and the civil law. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court correctly pointed out that most state 
courts that have considered similar questions label the rule of free 
access proffered by the Buccinos, but rejected by the court, as the 
"civil law rule," and that urged by the plaintiffs as the "common law 
rule."25 Whether other state high courts will ultimately make similar 
decisions to adopt the "common law rule" remains to be seen. 
Appellate courts around the country are quite sharply divided on this 
18. Id at 631. 
19. Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 848 A.2d 474, 478-79 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). 
rev� 869 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2005). 
20. Id at477-78. 
21. See id at 480. 
22. Id (quoting Flynn v. Beigel, 102 N.W2d 284, 290-91 (Minn. 1960)). 
23. Sec id at 482. 
24. Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2005) . 
. 
25. .Id.at.
�34-35. �e C:Onnecticut co� of appeals purposefully avoided this issue, 
noting that it did not perceive this case as reqmnng a choice between the application of 'civil law' or 'common law."' Buccino, 848 A.2d at 479 n.1 O. 
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issue; before Buccino, the high courts of at least six states had thus far 
chosen the "civil law rule," and at least six the "common law rule."26 
B. The Solution Articulated by Amencan Courts: A Choice 
Between the "Common Law Rule " and the "Civil Law Rule" 
1. The "Common Law Rule" 
The so-called "common law rule" is easy to understand. It is 
merely a logical extension of the familiar Latin maxim c4jus est 
solum7 ejus est usque ad crelum et ad inferos, meaning "[t]o whomever 
the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths."21 Under 
this rationale, a landowner's right to property is understood "to extend 
from heaven to hell."28 The common law rule regarding access to the 
surface of nonnavigable lakes, then, is consistent with concepts of 
absolute ownership.29 An owner "is entitled to exclusive dominion 
over his land, including the areas above and below its surface."30 
That right to exclusive dominion does not cease merely because 
the privately owned land is covered by water. The landowner has the 
right to the exclusive use and control of everything above and below 
his land, including the waters lying immediately above his bed. In 
essence, the common law rule treats the waters overlying privately 
26. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 234 (3d ed. 1997). Compare 
Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 791 (Fla. 1959); Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners 
Ass'n, 526 N.E. 2d 154, 154 (Ill. 1988); Burt v. Munger, 23 N.W2d 117, 120 (Mich. 1946); 
Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689, 689 (Minn. 1960); State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis 
Fritz Co., 193 So. 9, 9 (Miss. 1940); and Botton v. State, 420 P.2d 352, 352 (Wash. 1966) 
(adopting the civil law rule), with Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1243 (Ala. 1998); 
Medlock v. Galbreath, 187 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Ark. 1945); Lanier v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, 
Inc., 322 S.E.2d 494, 494 (Ga. 1984); Sanders v. De Rose, 191 N.E. 331, 333-34 (Ind. 1934); 
Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, 136 A.2d 645, 645 (N.J. 1957); andSmoulter v. Boyd, 58 A 144, 
147 (Pa. 1904) (adopting the common law rule). 
It is likely that only thirteen state supreme courts have yet decided this question because 
of the interplay between issues of surface access and navigability. States (such as California) 
which adopt a very expansive, recreation-based test of navigability (in lieu of the traditional 
commerce-based test), are much less likely to confront the surface access question. See, e.g., 
Nat'! Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 720 n.17 (Cal. 1983) ("A waterway usable 
only for pleasure boating is ... a navigable waterway . . . .  "). The navigability of the water 
body would provide all riparian landowners with surface access, without the need for 
consideration of the civil or common law rule. Id at 719-20; TARLOCK, supm note 9, § 8.28, 
at 8-45 to -52. 
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (6th ed. 1990); accord Russ VERSTEEG, EssE� LATIN FOR LAWYERS 127 (1990); see also Clement L. Bouve, Private Ownership 
of Airspace, 1 AIR L. REv. 232, 244 (1930) (tracing the origins of cqjus est so/um). 
28. GETCHES, supra note 26, at 234. 
29. Id 
30. 1 s.v CIRIACY-WANTRUP ET AL., WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 52 (Robert Emmet 
Clark ed., 1967). 
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owned lakebed as if they were dry land.31 Thus, the common law rule 
finds that one riparian landowner crossing the boundary lines by 
steering his boat into water overlying bed owned by another riparian 
landowner, or indeed merely casting a fishing line into water overlying 
bed owned by another, commits a trespass. 32 
The beauty of the rule is in its consistent application. Under the 
common law rule, a landowner is entitled to insist upon exclusive 
dominion, applied both to dry land and to any waters that might cover 
those lands. 33 It follows that under this rule, the right to make 
nonconsumptive or recreational uses of the waters of nonnavigable 
lakes lies solely in the owner of the bed immediately beneath that 
water.34 
Pennsylvania's application of the rule is illustrative. In the 1904 
case of Smoulter v. Boyd, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved a 
controversy between two landowners bordering a nonnavigable lake 
about one mile long and one-half mile wide.35 The plaintiffs sued a 
defendant who owned approximately 215 acres of land, including the 
bed of and all of the land surrounding the lake, with the exception of 
about five acres.36 Plaintiffs owned the other five acres of land, which 
included about one and one-quarter acres of bed.37 Approximately 
eight years after purchasing the property, the defendant "built a boom 
of heavy logs fastened together at the ends by iron links, and thereon 
erected a barbed wire fence across the surface of the lake."38 The boom 
followed the boundary lines of defendant's property, and sought to 
exclude other riparian landowners on the lake from fishing or boating 
over any portion of bed owned by the defendant.39 The minority bed 
owners sought an injunction ordering defendant to remove the boom 
and allow free surface access to all riparian landowners "for the 
purposes of boating and sailing.'"'0 
3 1 .  Recent Cases, Water.s and Watercourses-Non-Navigable Lakes-Right of [Jse 
in Bed Owners, 26 MINN. L. REv. 569, 570 ( 1 941-1942). 
32. James W Cullis, Note, Extent of Pdvate Rights in Nonnavigable Lakes, 5 U. FLA. 
L. REv. 166, 176 (1952). 
33. Joseph B. Gaudet, ftHlter Recreation--Public Use of''Pn'vate" i-Yaters, 52 CALL 
REv. 171,  174 (1964). 
34. Id 
35. 58 A. 144, 144-45 (Pa. 1904). 
36. Id at 145. 
37. Id 
38. Id (internal quotation omitted). 
39. Id 
40. Id at 145-46. 
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In analyzing the respective rights of the parties to make 
nonconsumptive uses of the surface of the lake, the Pennsylvania court 
first noted that the defendant's deed to a portion of property including 
the bed of the lake "gave him title ad crelum et ad inferos, and hence 
the waters on his land were subject to his use and enjoyment."'11 The 
court viewed the plaintiffs' boating and swimming activities on the 
defendant's property as trespasses, just as if that property were dry 
land.42 Any use of the defendant's property by an unauthorized 
person-even a fellow riparian landowner for the purpose of boating 
or fishing-was held to be "an infringement of the rights of property 
vested in the owner of the land."43 The court, therefore, found the 
defendant to be within his rights in erecting the boom, and denied the 
plaintiffs' request for an injunction.44 
In the century since Smoulter, the courts of a number of other 
states have used the principle cz!f us est solum to come to the same 
conclusion: a riparian landowner on a nonnavigable lake may make 
nonconsumptive uses of the water only above bed he owns.45 Cujus est 
solum is the antithesis of a rule of free surface access for all riparian 
landowners. As applied to water bodies, it protects the landowner's 
exclusive dominion in his property as if it were dry land, for the 
landowner's rights extend to anything found above or below the 
surface of that land. 
2. The "Civil Law Rule" 
The so-called "civil law rule" is quite the opposite. It rejects the 
principle ClljUS est solum and instead embraces free access for all 
riparian landowners.46 While the rule admits the existence of a 
"technical trespass," it sanctions that result in favor of the sharing of 
waters in which the parties have a common interest.41 Simply stated, 
the civil law rule permits a riparian landowner "to use the surface of 
the entire lake for fishing, boating, and bathing as long as he does not 
41. Id at 146. 
42. Id at 147. 
43. Id 
44. Id 
45. See, e.g., Medlock v. Galbreath, 187 S.W2d 545, 546 (Ark. 1945); sec also 2 
HENRY P. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS§ 375, at 1383 (1904) ("An 
e�cl�sive right of fishery in the water adjacent to property is not one of the rights of the 
npanan owner. He can claim such a right only when he owns the soil Wlder the water . .. "); 
Recent Cases, supra note 31, at 570 (citing some jurisdictions' dispositive use of the 
principle). 
46. Cullis, supra note 32, at 176. 
47. SceCIRACY-WANTRUPET AL., supra note 30, at 54; Cullis, supra note 32, at 176. 
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unduly interfere with the rights of the other [riparian landowner] 
proprietors."48 
American courts adopting this civil law rule often give no real 
justification for their choice.49 Occasionally though, state courts 
espouse one of four common reasons for departing from traditional 
notions of an owner's right to exclusive dominion above and below his 
land: (1) the common law rule is too difficult to follow with regard to 
lakes;50 (2) there can be no private ownership in the waters or in the 
fish of a nonnavigable lake and, thus, use of the surface should be open 
to all riparian landowners;51 (3) common use of the surface of 
nonnavigable lakes is customary;52 or ( 4) economic policy requires the 
adoption of the civil law rule.53 
48. Cullis, supra note 32, at 176. 
49. See, e.g., Burt v. Munger, 23 N.W2d 117, 119-20 (Mich. 1946); Botton v. State, 
420 P.2d 352, 356 (Wash. 1966). 
50. Problems with detennining exact boundaries and developing a mechanism to 
ensure a landowner's exclusive dominion in water overlying his bed are viewed as 
insurmountable under this justification for a rule of free riparian landowner access. See 1 
CIRACY-WANTRUP ET AL., supra note 30, at 54. The trouble with detennining precise limits of 
ownership inherent in surveying water bodies is certainly exacerbated when lakes are 
involved. Particularly when the bed of a lake is divided among a number of riparian 
landowners, it is not so simple as merely drawing a line down the middle, as with a river. The 
problem of enforcement is inextricably tied to the difficulty of demarking clear Jines. A 
riparian owner fishing or boating on lake waters over bed he owns "could not be conveniently 
arrested the moment he arrived at the medium filum aqu;e ex adverso of his land, or the 
moment he traversed the boundaries." Mackenzie v. Bankes, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1324, 1329-
30 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.). Thus, the sheer difficulty of accurately applying cujus 
est solum to nonnavigable lakes has persuaded some jurisdictions to adopt the "civil law 
rule." See Cullis, supra note 32, at 177. 
51. The Mississippi Supreme Court offers this unpersuasive justification for adopting 
the "civil law rule." See State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 193 So. 9, 11 (Miss. 
1940). That any owner's land contains wildlife, which are things insusceptible of ownership, 
should not justify public intrusion of the landowner's dominion solely for the sake of pursuit. 
Such an intrusion without permission would be a clear trespass on dry land. I find a 
distinction simply because land is covered with water untenable. 
52. See id (favoring the "civil law rule" in order to respect a practice honored by the 
people "for time out of mind"). 
53. This is, in my view, the most persuasive and honest justification for adopting the 
"civil law rule" given by American courts. It is also the most pragmatic. The fact is that 
economic development may be stymied by the adoption of any rule other than one allowing 
all riparian landowners access to the entire surface of the water body on which they border. 
Unfortunately, far too few jurisdictions proffer such a reasonable explanation. In fact, Florida 
and Minnesota are alone in admitting economic or public policy as the primary force behind 
their adoption of the "civil law rule." See, e.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla. 
1959); Recent Cases, supra note 31, at 570-71. Florida has recognized that many of the 
state's important recreational water bodies are relatively small lakes not accessible to the 
general public, but that a significant volume of sporting activity essential to the state 
economy, in particular water-skiing and sailing, is conducted on those "private" lakes. See 
Duval, 114 So. 2d at 795. Preventing public use would simply place an unacceptable strain 
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Some of these policies are certainly legitimate and may deserve 
protection. The problem is that all too often, c?urts choose to ado�t 
the civil law rule or the common law rule seemmgly because of their 
labels, or because of the purported sources of the rules, rather than 
because an exhaustive analysis of state goals points in a particular 
direction. 54 Jurisdictions considering whether to adopt a rule of free 
riparian landowners access to nonnavigable lakes should consider the 
above-articulated, and other, policies and develop a rule that best 
protects the policies the particular jurisdiction deems important.55 
They should not, however, refer to, or rely upon, incorrect labels or the 
misguided impressions those labels give. 
II. A CRITICAL HISTORICAL REVIEW 
The truth is that there is no dichotomy between the civil and 
common law rules in this area. In other words, there is no civil law 
rule that is different from a common law rule regarding riparian 
landowners' surface access to nonnavigable lakes. The idea that there 
are divergent common law and civil law rules is the result of an error 
that is more than 200 years old. The rule of surface access was, in fact, 
historically the same at both common and civil law. Specifically, the 
rule was that a riparian landowner's access was limited to the surface 
waters over his bed-a mere application of the principle cujus est 
solum to land covered by water. The creation of a different civil law 
rule can be traced to an identifiable point: a series of early nineteenth­
century Scottish cases. That distortion of the rule was incorporated 
into American jurisprudence by the United States Supreme Court, and 
then further complicated by the Court through a series of errors in 
interpreting its sources. This Part will explain the historical rule in 
on an economy heavily dependent on tourism. See id at 791; Recent Cases, supra note 31, at 
570-71. Similarly, Minnesota has taken the position that while its nonnavigable lakes cannot 
be opened to the entire public in accordance with state definitions of navigability, they should 
at least be made accessible to the greatest number of people possible. See Recent Cases, 
supra note 31, at 570-71. 
54. See, e.g., Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1249 (Ala. 1998) (adopting the 
common law rule solely because Alabama is a "common law state") . 
55. States occasionally adopt both the civil and conunon law rules, depending upon 
whether the lake at issue is natural or artificial or whether the bed is owned by virtue of a 
deed or merely by virtue of the ownership of riparian landowner lands. Compare Duval, 114 
So. 2d at 791 (adopting the civil law rule for natural lake), with Anderson v. Bell, 433 So. 2d 
1202, 1202 (Fla. 1983) (adopting the common law rule for manmade lake); compare 
Improved Realty Corp. v. Sowers, 78 S.E.2d 588, 592 (Va. 1953) (adopting the civil law rule 
when bed is owned by virtue of ownership of riparian landowner lands), with Wickouski v. 
Swift, 124 S.E.2d 892, 895 (Va. 1962) (adopting the common law rule where bed ownership 
is expressed in deed). 
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both common and civil law jurisdictions, detail the point at which the 
rules are supposed to have diverged, and set out how American cou11s 
came to view the newly divergent rules as stenuning from the 
differences in the common and civil law sy stems. 
A .  The History of the "Common Law Rule" 
The history of the common law rule of restricted access is, 
essentially� the histor y of the development of the doctrine cujus est 
solum-a rule of civilian origin. It was the application of that doctrine 
to cases involving water that gave rise to what came to be known as the 
common law rule regarding riparian landowner access. 
1. Tracing the Origins of the Doctrine Cujus Est Sohun 
a. On the Continent: The Birth of a Doctrine 
The history of the doctrine Cl!JUS est solum� ejus est usque ad 
ca:Jum et ad inferos is indeed fascinating. The doctrine is often 
referred to as "one of the oldest rules of property known to the law,"''' 
for quite good reason. While the maxim is most commonly bel ieved 
to have originated with the well-famed seventeenth-century judge and 
jurist Lord Coke,57 the tr uth is that it was around many, many centuries 
before Coke popularized it in Britain. Cujus est solum's origins can 
actually be traced back to Roman times. It is likely a creation of the 
twelfth-century school of Roman law devotees known as the 
Glossators. 
Although recorded Roman legal history dates back as far as five 
centuries B.C., perhaps the most important and widely celebrated 
development in Roman law is the completion of the sixth-century 
compilations at the behest of Emperor Justinian. 58 Justinian 
commanded a team of legal elites to develop a number of Roman law 
works in the hopes of preserving the best of the classical Roman 
literature from prior centuries and of providing a statement of the law 
in force in his own day.59 His team proved quite prolific, producing a 
number of important works of Roman law-most notably, Justinian's 
56. �e Howard H. Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky, 21 MINN. L. REV. 773, 774 (1937) (quoting Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W 93, 95 (1902)). 
57. See, e.g., Note, Trespass by Airplane, 32 HAR.v. L. REv. 569, 569 (1919). 
58. See GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ROMAN LAW 118, 395 (2003). 
59. Id. at 388. 
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Digest60 Although it is a relatively crude "Code" by modem 
standards, Justinian's Digest has profound historical significance as 
one of the earliest and most comprehensive collections of written law.61 
The method of the Digest was not to establish a wholly new law, 
but merely to collect and detail the best surviving works of the Roman 
Empire.62 Thus, the Digest took the form not of a scientifically 
organized and systematized work, but rather of a compilation of the 
writings of many legal scholars.63 Among the dozens of legal scholars 
whose works were included in the Digest were the second-century 
Roman jurists Paul and Venuleius.64 
As groundbreaking as the Digest was, its influence waned in the 
centuries after its preparation. 65 Part of the problem was linguistic; the 
Digest was written in Latin, and thus was inaccessible to later 
generations of legal scholars, many of whom read only Greek.1'0 
Further, legal scholars and practitioners began preparing their own 
commentaries on the Diges� which over time became more influential 
than the Digestitself.61 Thus, Roman law fell into a period of decline 
for nearly 600 y ears. 
In the late eleventh century, though, scholar� in Pisa, Italy, 
stumbled upon a manuscript of Justinian's Digest68 The discovery 
sparked a renewed interest in Roman law, prompting a number of legal 
scholars to abandon their work on local law to focus on the Digest69 
One group of legal scholars in particular, the Glossators, came to 
devote its life's work to commenting upon these newly discovered 
Roman law works.10 
The Glossators focused their attention primarily on Justinian's 
sixth-century Digest 11 For the Glossators, it was just beneath the 
divine.12 The Digest was considered intellectually superior to the 
60. Id at 393. 
6 1 .  Id at 395. 
62. See id at 388. 
63. See id at 387; Peter Stein, Justinian's Compilation: Classical Legacy and Legal 
Soun;e, 8 TuL. EUR. & Crv. L.F. 1, 1 (1993). 
64. See HANS Juuus WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HiSlDRICAL INTRODUCTION 1 1 9  
(1951); Stein, supmnote 63, at 1 .  
65. MousoURAKis, supra note 58, at 402. 
66. Id at 401 -02. 
67. Id at 402. 
. 68.. 
Id at 423; see also PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 43 ( 1999) 
(d1scussmg the rediscovery of the Digest in Pisa). 
69. See MousoURAKis, supnmote 58, at 423. 
70. See STEIN, sup.ra note 68, at 45, 47. 
7 1 .  See id at 47. 
72. Id at 46. 
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contemporary works of the day, and, surprisingly, more suited to 
serving the burgeoning mercantile economy in Italy.13 As such, the 
Glossators came to view Justinian's texts as nearly perfect-free from 
contradiction and sufficient for solving any legal problem that might 
arise.74 The Glossators, therefore, directed their efforts at providing 
cross-references to various provisions of Justinian's works, explaining 
seemingly contradictory passages, and elaborating upon the texts. "s 
The Glossators' works initially took the form of "interlinear glosses'' 
(and gave rise to the name by which the school would be known), but 
eventually expanded to commentary in the margins of the texts of the 
Digest76 
The most influential gloss was that prepared by Accursius 
(perhaps the most famed member of the Glossators ' school) and 
published (together with the original text of the Digest) around 1 23 5 . '' 
With over 96,000 glosses,18 the Accursian Gloss was viewed as not 
only thorough but also exceptional. "For centuries, the Accursian 
Gloss was the basis of any doctrine which claimed to be derived from 
Roman law. The maxim came to be accepted that 'What the Gloss 
does not recognise, the Court does not recognise."'19 
The phrase cujus est solum was first used by Accursius in glosses 
explaining two separate provisions of Justinian's Digest80 The first 
passage is one penned by the Roman jurist Paul to describe the rights 
of the owners of two estates between which lies some public property.8 1  
Paul explained that the intermediate public property does not prevent 
the landowners from establishing servitudes between them, such as 
those regulating the height of their buildings.82 
But this situation does prevent the existence of a servitude giving 
a right to insert a beam or to have a roof or other structure projecting 
from a building or to discharge a flow of rainwater or rainwater 
dripping from the eaves of a house. The reason is that the air space 
above such ground must be kept clear. 83 
73. MOUSOURAKis, supra note 58, at 423-24. 
74. STEIN, supra note 68, at 46. 
75. Id at 46-47. 
76. Id at46. 
77. Id at 48; DITLEV TAMM, ROMAN LAW AND EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 205 
(Michael Murphy et al. trans., 1 st  ed. 1997). 
78. STEIN, supra note 68, at 48; TAAM, supra note 77, at 205. 
79. STEIN, supra note 68, at 49. 
80. See J.M. SPATGHT,AIRCRAFT IN PEACEANDIBE LAW 54 ( 1 9 1 9). 
81.  DIG. 8.2.1 (Paul, Edict, bk. 1). 
82. Id 
83. Id. 
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The second relevant passage in Justinian's Digest was drafted by 
the jurist Venuleius and explains the rights of landowners vis-a-vis 
those acting "by force or stealth" on their land. 84 
If someone overhangs a tomb with a projection or water drip, even 
though it does not touch the tomb itself, an action can rightly be 
brought against him, because it has been done by force or stealth to the 
tomb. For the tomb is not only the place which receives the burial, but 
all the sky above it; and for this reason an action can also be brought for 
tomb violation. 85 
Seven centuries after Justinian's Digest was complete, Accursius 
used cujus est solum as an annotation to these passages,86 and the 
maxim's long life began. While the maxim arguably gives much 
broader effect to the above-quoted passages than is necessary-some 
even accuse Accursius of a tautology for the extreme breadth81-the 
intent of the phrase is clear and gives some depth to an ancient and 
fundamental tenet of property law: a landowner has the "right of 
freedom from interference in the use and enjoy ment of his land,"88 and 
that right to enjoy without interference exists above and below the 
ground owned as well. The ancient jurists quoted in Justinian's Digest 
expressed this freedom in the context of the right of a landowner to 
complain about dripping water from a neighbor's constructs onto his 
property or tomb.89 Accursius' vision of the concept, articulated with 
the maxim cujus est solum, merely acknowledges that the freedom of a 
landowner extends beyond the interference of dripping and bey ond the 
context of public property and tombs. 90 
84. See DIG. 43.24.22.4 (Venuleius, Interdicts, bk. 2). 
85. Id 
86. See SPAIGHT, supra note 80, at 54; Bouve, supra note 27, at 244-48; Hackley, 
supra note 56, at 777. 
87. See EUGENE SAUZE, LES QUESTIONS DE RESPONSABILITE EN MATr.ERE D' AVIATION 
26 (1916) ("Accurse . . .  ne faitque commettre une tautologie . . . .  "); Bouve, supra note 27, at 
247 ("Accursius . . .  is merely guilty of tautology."). 
88. Hackley, supra note 56, at 777. 
89. DIG. 43.24.22.14 (Venuleius, Interdicts, bk. 2). 
90. Given this historical backdrop, there is some debate over whether cujus est solwn 
is truly a "Roman" rule. See, e.g. , SPAIGHT, supra note 80, at 54; Bouve, supra note 27, at 
243-46. Some suggest that any principle of law not found in the "Roman Code" (referring 
primarily to Justinian's Digest and Institutes) is not one of Roman origin. See SPAIGHT, supra 
note 80, at 54. Under this theory, then, a principle set out for the first time in the Accursian 
Gloss on Justinian's works is not "Roman." I view the distinction as irrelevant. First, I 
believe that Justinian's Diges� as modified by the Glossators and Commentators in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, is the body of work most modem scholars have in mind 
when th�y reference "Roman law." It is, at least, the ius commune-ahnost universally 
charactenzed as Roman law-that was widely received in Europe in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. SeeTAAM, supra note 77, at 203. Second, a principle originating with the 
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The doctrine might have lived on only in the Accursian Gloss 
were it not for the Glossators' tenacity. The Glossators were extremely 
successful in contributing to the development and influence of the civil 
law because they spread their teachings throughout Europe.91 In the 
thirteenth century, they established a program at the University of 
Bologna, the sole purpose of which was to spread the teachings of 
Roman law.92 Accursius was a prominent faculty member at the 
University of Bologna,93 but his son, Franciscus (also a prominent 
jurist and eventual professor at the University of Bologna94), would 
prove to play a greater role in disseminating the doctrine of cujus est 
solum outside of Italy. 
b. Crossing the English Channel: Cujus Est Solwn Finds a 
Home in Great Britain 
On his return from a visit to Bologna in 1273, the English king, 
Edward I, persuaded Franciscus to accompany him back to England 
and deliver lectures on Roman law at Oxford University.95 Franciscus 
agreed, and worked for Edward I for nearly ten years, holding, among 
other positions, that of consilian"us to the king, a position "of trust and 
confidence close to the king's person."96 It is believed that Franciscus 
passed his father's phrase on to his pupils and colleagues in England, 
where the maxim became extremely popular,97 and that Franciscus'  
lofty position and influence with the king explains "how and why the 
English judges of Edward I came to accept as a principle of law the 
maxim coined by" Accursius.98 
Accursian Gloss is at worst a thirteenth-century barbarization of or extension of Roman law. 
It is, in any event, a rule of civilian origin. 
91.  SeeTAAM, supm note 77,  at 203. 
92. Bouve, supra note 27, at 246. 
93. Hackley, supm note 56, at 777. 
94. TAAM, supm note 77, at 205; Bouve, supra note 27, at 248. 
95. Bouve, supm note 27, at 248; Hackley, supra note 56, at 777. 
96. Bouve, supra note 27, at 248. 
97. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 4 1  F.2d 929, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1930). 
98.. �ouve, �upra note 27, at 248; see also Hackley, supm note 56, at 777 (discussing the maxun m English cases). At least one scholar argues that the maxim cujus est solwn 
originated not with Accursius, but with his fellow Glossator Gino da Pistoia. See LUIGI 
MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 474-75 (John Lisle trans., Augustus M. Kelley 
1 968) (1912) (stating that to determine the ownership of title to minerals beneath the soil's 
surface, many scholars "invoke Roman law;' which they argue provides that the "owner of the 
soil is the owner of a column of air to heaven and of a column of earth to ' infemus ' but such 
statements are a hyperbole invented by Gino da Pistoia and have no foundation in the sources 
of Roman law"). Support for such a theory is waning, as it is backed by no documentarv 
evidence and is belied by notes showing the Accursian Gloss as the earliest discovered use �f 
the phrase. See SPAIGHT, supm note 80, at 54. 
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While the maxim was developed and spread to England without 
his assistance, it undoubtedly owes its survival there to Lord Coke. In 
his influential Institutes of the Laws of England, first published in the 
early seventeenth century, Lord Coke, in defining and describing land 
and all its appurtenants, noted "the earth hath in law a great extent 
upwards, not only of water . . .  but of ayre and all other things even up 
to heaven; for cujus est solum cjus est usque ad crelum."99 After its 
recognition in Coke's Institutes, the maxim was applied in two nearly 
contemporaneous seventeenth-century English cases, also decided by 
Lord Coke.100 In both Penroddocks Case and Eaten s Case, the 
defendants' buildings were placed in such a way that their eaves 
projected rainwater onto the plaintiffs'  land. 101 The court held, in each 
case, that the projection gave rise to a good claim of nuisance for 
which plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.102 Lord Coke offered the 
following language in support of the nuisance finding in Eaten s Case. 
"Also ctljus est solum, eyiis est usque ad crelwn . . . and by the 
overbuilding upon part of the house of the plaintiffs, he has deprived 
them of the air; also he has prevented them from building their house 
higher . . . .  "103 
After its recognition by Lord Coke, cujus est solwn continued to 
be a part of England's body of legal literature. Eminent common law 
scholars such as Blackstone and Kent described and applied the 
maxim in their commentaries on English property law. 104 And though 
99. 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OR COMMENTARY UPON 
LITTLElDN bk. I , § 4a, at 1 98 (19th ed. 1 853). 
1 00. See Penruddock's Case, ( 1 597) 5 Coke's Rep. l OO(b), I O l (a)-(b) (C.P.); Baten's 
Case, (161 1 )  9 Coke's Rep 53(b), 54(a)-(b); see also Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 
F.2d 929, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1 930) (discussing the history of the maxim). 
1 0 1 .  Penruddock, 5 Coke's Rep. at l O l (a); Eaten, 9 Coke's Rep. at 54(a). 
1 02. Penruddock, 5 Coke's Rep. at 1 02(b); Eaten, 9 Coke's Rep. at 54(b)-55(a). 
1 03. Eaten, 9 Coke's Rep. at 54(a)-(b). 
104. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 8  
(1766) (" Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad crelum, is the maxim o f  the law, upwards; 
therefore no man may erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's land; and, 
downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land, and the center of the 
earth, belongs to the owner of the surface . . . .  So that the word 'land' includes not only the 
face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it."); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 401 (O.W Holmes, Jr., ed., 1 2th ed. 1 873) ("Corporeal hereditarnents are 
confined to land, which, according to Lord Coke, includes not only the ground or soil, but 
every thing which is attached to the earth, whether by the course of nature, as trees, herbage, 
and water, or by the hand of man, as houses and other buildings; and which has an indefinite 
extent, upwards as well as downwards, so as to include every thing terrestrial, under or over 
it." (footnotes omitted)). 
Kent's use of the maxim is somewhat less surprising than Blackstone's, as Kent is often 
considered a shameless borrower of civilian concepts. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Cowts or 
Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891,  904 n.64 (2002); 
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the maxim was not cited often in English jurisprudence until the mid­
nineteenth century,105 by 1884 English courts were "conceding that the 
maxim was part of the common law of England."106 
2. The Doctrine's Lengthy (and Continuing) Life 
The maxim was warmly received in the United States as wel l, 
with its principle gaining recognition in �erican courts 
.
as ea�ly as 
1 832.107 Cujas est solum has since been cited countless tunes m the 
courts of virtually every state in a wide variety of contexts.108 It has 
even been twice recognized by the United States Supreme Court 
(though the extension of the doctrine to prevent alleged trespasses by 
aircraft was rejected in both cases). 109 
In addition to being adopted by common law jurisdictions such as 
England and the United States, cujus est solum found a home early on 
in the modern civilian world. The first true codification of French law, 
Napoleon's 1804 Code civil, included a statement that "[p]roperty in 
Charles L. Barzun, Note, Common Sense and Legal Science, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 05 1 , 1 05 8  
(2004). 
105. See Fay v. Prentice, (1 845) 135 Eng. Rep. 769, 77 1, 773 (C.P.); Swetland v. 
Curtiss Airports Corp., 4 1  F.2d 929, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1 930) (same); see also Hackley, supra 
note 56, at 779 (discussing the history of the maxim). 
106. Hackley, supra note 56, at 78 1 (citing Wandworth Bd. of Works v. United Tel. 
Co., (1884) 13 Q.B. 904, 9 1 5). 
107. See Winton v. Comish, 5 Ohio 477, 478 ( 1 832) ("He who owns a piece of land 
. . . is the owner of everything underneath in a direct line to the center of the earth and 
everything above to the heavens."). For an early American recognition of the maxim with full 
use of the Latin phraseology, see Lyman v. Hale, 1 1  Conn. 1 77, 179 (Conn. 1 836). 
108. See, e.g., Hannabalson v. Sessions, 1 1 6 Iowa 457, 461 (Iowa 1902) (finding 
trespass in "thrust[ing]" fist across boundary line of another's property); Smith v. New Eng. 
Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 388 (Mass. 1930) (finding technical trespass, but no inj unctive 
relief granted, for aircraft flying over plaintiffs' property); Jones v. Vt. Asbestos Corp., 1 82 A. 
291, 303 (Vt. 1936) (finding title to gold and silver mines). 
109. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799 (1972); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 
260-61 (1946). Cujus est solum was and still is often criticized by both English and 
American jurists as "grievously misunderstood and misapplied," particularly as it relates to 
questions involving air space and developments in aviation. See, e.g., William M .  Wherry & 
Cyril Hyde Condon, Air Travel and Trespass, 68 U.S. L. REv. 78, 84 (1934) (quoting ARNOLD 
MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TIIE AIR 33 (1st ed. 1 932)); see also John A. Eubank, The Doctni1e of 
the Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, 12 B.U. L. REv. 4 1 4, 417 ( 1932) (discussing cujus 
est solum in the context of forbidding aerial navigation over one's private property); George 
E. Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the .Ali' or Air Space Above Landowner's Premises 
with Special Reference to Aviation, 16 IOWA L. REv. 1 69, 1 74-75 (193 1 )  (same). At least one 
scholar has argued that the maxim "has no authority in English law. Only in so far as it has 
been adopted as part of our law by the judges or by textwriters of a very special degree of 
authority, need it concern us." Wherry & Condon, supra, at 84 (quoting McNair, supra, at 
33). But whatever its origin or suitability to modern times, it can hardly be argued that the 
principle behind the maxim is a part of the common law in both England and the United 
States. 
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the soil imports property above and beneath."1 10 Germany's first major 
codification, the 1 900 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, provided similarly: 
"[T]he right of the owner of a piece of land extends to the space above 
the surface and to the terrestrial body under the surface."1 1 1  Both 
countries retain the principle in their current codifications. 1 12 The 
maxim's homeland, Italy, has kept it. 1 1 3  And civil law codifications in 
Spain, Argentina,  Japan , Switzerland, and many other countries also 
include the principle. 1 14 
In sum, the history of cujus est solum is the story of a civilian 
maxim incorporated virtually worldwide, in both civil and common 
law systems. Whether the doctrine is Roman or a mere "gloss" upon 
or barbarization of Roman law, 1 15 it is civilian. And thus ,  the backbone 
of the common law relating to airspace, subsurface minerals and 
mines, and, most importantly for this discussion, water, is a Latin 
maxim with its genesis in the civil law. 
B The Point of Distortion: The Application ofCujus Est Solum in 
Scottish Uilter Cases 
Nearly as quickly as the doctrine of cujus est solwn spread across 
the continents, it was applied in cases involving access to water. 1 16 And 
it is in the maxim's application to this highly controversial area that the 
discontinuity began. 
As one would expect, as applied to cases involving access to the 
surface of nonnavigable water bodies, the maxim has long provided 
110. C. CIV. art. 552 (1804). 
111. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Jan. 1 ,  1975 , 150 , as amended, 
§ 905 (Ian S. Forrester et al. trans. , 1975). 
112. See C. crv. Art. 552 (2006), available at http://www. legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
htmJ/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm; Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code]­
Jan. 1, 1992, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 3 ,  as amended, § 905 , avmlable at http://www. 
gesetze.2me.net/bgb_!bgb_0929.htm; see also Bouve, supra note 27 , at 246 (discussing the 
maxim in the French Civil Code); Hiram L. Jome, Property in the .Ali- as Affected by the 
Airplane and the Radio, 62 AM. L. REV. 887 , 900 ( 1 928) (discussing the maxim in the French 
and German civil codes). 
113. See Eubank , supra note 109, at 416. 
114. Id; Jome, supra note 112, at 900-01. The right of freedom from interference is 
limited under the German and Swiss codifications of cujus est soluni to heights or  depths at 
which the landowner has an "interest . . .  in . . .  prevention" or only "so far as the exercise of 
the ownership requires." Jome , supra note 112, at 900-01. The basic principle, though, is 
unchanged. 
115. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
. 116. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 528-30 (Pa. 1855) (finding no cause of actton for mining company's operations on its own land which interfered with the supply of 
percolating water to springs on the plaintiff's land; given the doctrine of cujus est solum the 
plaintiff was "justified in all that he did" on his own land). 
' 
920 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 8 0 : 90 1  
justification for the so-called common law r:ile. . Specifically, the 
application of cujus est solum to such a scenano yields the result that 
each riparian landowner is entitled to access only the surface of waters 
overlying lakebed that he owns. . So, how did the so-called civil law rule come about? If cu1us est 
solum applies plainly to grant a riparian landowner surface access to 
waters overlying his bed alone, why have some American courts be� 
pronouncing a rule of free riparian landowner acces� to . the entire 
surface of nonnavigable lakes? The rule of free access is said to come 
from the civil law,1 11 but the civil law rule, as demonstrated above, is 
actually cujus est solum. 
The point of origin of the rule of free access, and more pointedly, 
its divergence from the widely adopted rule cujus est solum, is, in fact, 
identifiable. The rule of free access is actually not a civil law rule at 
all, but rather the product of a series of eighteenth- and nineteenth­
century Scottish cases. The Scots distorted the widely adopted rule of 
litnited surface access and, in so doing, became the lone civilians to 
recognize the right of a minority bed owner to fish, fowl, and boat over 
the entire surface of a nonnavigable lake, despite his ownership of only 
a portion of the bed. 
Although the genesis of this Scottish rule might be traced back as 
far as 1 797, 1 1 8  the generally prevailing view among Scottish courts is 
that the rule of free surface access first gained legitimacy with the 
House of Lords' 1 19 1 856 decision in Menzies v. Macdonald120 The 
water body around which the dispute in Macdonald centered was a 
lake approximately two miles wide and eleven miles long.121 Two 
barons owned the majority of the land surrounding the lake, but there 
was also a minority owner, General Macdonald, who owned property 
1 1 7. See supra Part I.B.2. 
1 1 8. Mackenzie v. Bankes, ( 1878) 3 App. Cas. 1 324, 1341 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Scot.). 
1 1 9. The 
_
House of Lords, though m�st commonly known as the high court of England, 
was also the high court of Scotland until a Supreme Court was created for the United 
Kingdom in 2005. DAVID MAxwELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF SESSION 3 ( 1 980) see 
also Susanna F. Fischer, Playing Poohsticks with the BritJ�t;h Constitution? The Blair 
Government's Proposal To Abolish the Lord Chancellor, 24 PENN. ST. lNT'L L. REv. 257, 262-
63 (2005). Although it was a primarily parliamentary body, it also exercised the functions of 
an appellate court. See MAxwELL, supra, at 3. 
120. [1 856] L.R.H.L. Sc. 463, 463 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) 
121 .  Id Scot�and �ollows the use rules of the United States in this regard. Thus, beca�e the lake at issue m Macdonald was nonnavigable, it was not open to the general public s use. 3 DAVID M. WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOITISH PRIVATE LAW 1 07 1 08 (4th ed 1989). ' . 
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with a waterfront of only about 1200 yards.122 General Macdonald 
claimed that his ownership of lands surrounding the lake, and of a 
portion of the bed of the lake, entitled him to sail and fish not merely 
on the waters of the lake over the bed he owned, but over the entirety of 
the lake. 123 In essence, General Macdonald argued that he be 
recognized as "on a footing of perfect equality" with the two barons, at 
least for purposes of "boating, fishing, floating timber, and every other 
use of which the lake was susceptible."124 Much to the barons' chagrin, 
General Macdonald also built a tavern on his lakefront property, and 
invited its patrons to join him in sailing and fishing over the entirety of 
the lake.125 The barons sued to enjoin General Macdonald from using 
the waters of the lake over the bed they owned, and to stop him from 
inviting his guests at the tavern to do so; they wanted a judgment 
recognizing the rights of all lakefront owners to use only the waters 
covering land within their boundaries. 126 
The House of Lords denied the barons' request for an injunction, 
holding that the right of fishing and sailing over the entire lake flowed 
naturally from the ownership of a mere portion of riparian landowner 
land. 127 Thus, all riparian landowners, no matter their percentage share 
of ownership, held full rights of surface access on the lake. Those 
rights to use the waters of the entire lake were not granted without 
limitation though. The House of Lords recognized that where there is 
more than one riparian landowner, judicial regulation may be required; 
one riparian landowner may attempt to make more use of the water 
body than that to which he is entitled.128 The court did not actually 
122. Macdonald, (1 856) L.R.H.L. Sc. at463. 
123. Id 
124. Id 
125. Id at 464. 
126. Id at 465. 
127. Id at 466. 
128. Id at 466, 473. As an illustration of a scenario that might give rise to a "right of 
action for the regulation of the enjoyment," the Macdonald court offered the following 
hypothet and commentary: 
Suppose it were not possible for more than any given number of boats, say a 
thousand, to be simultaneously engaged in fishing upon the lake, [one riparian 
landowner] would be entitled to have five hundred so employed, and [another 
riparian landowner] would be entitled to have five hundred so employed . . . .  [One 
riparian landowner] could not, by alienating to others, give a right to more than his 
due share. But if he keeps within that limit [other riparian landowners have] no 
right to complain. 
Id at 473. The House of Lords gives no indication of whether its solution to this hypothet 
depends
. 
upon roughly equal percentages of bed ownership. If, for example, there were ten 
owners mstead of two, on the same lake, would each owner be entitled to have 100 boats on 
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engage i n  any such 'judicial regulation," or quantify the rights of use 
of each party. Rather, its judgment is limited to a declaration of the 
right of all riparian landowners to access the surface of the entire lake. 
Interestingly, the House of Lords neither articulated a rationale 
for the rule it espoused in Macdonald, nor cited any authorities 
implying such a rule. Yet it departed significantly from the application 
of czljus est so/um and its typical result of limited surface access in 
riparian landowners. 
Nearly twenty years later though, in its 1 878 decision in 
Mackenzie v. Bankes, the House of Lords further developed and 
articulated the rationale behind the rule first laid out in Macdonald129 
Mackenzie and Bankes owned neighboring lands along an eight-mile 
nonnavigable lake. 130 Mackenzie's lands were situated near the west 
and south sides of the water body, while Bankes owned land on the 
north and southeast sides.131 At the southeast corner of the water body, 
its width suddenly contracted substantially.132 A "narrow low-lying 
ridge" in that area caused a significant increase in depth before the 
lake widened out again further to the southeast of the ridge. 133 The 
areas on either side of the ridge eventually came to be known 
differently, with that on the northwest side of the ridge dubbed "Fionn 
loch," and that on the southeast side of the ridge called "Dubh loch."134 
Mackenzie made free use of the waters of Dubh lake (for fishing, 
fowling, and boating) for more than thirty years without challenge.135 
But in 1 876, Bankes stopped Mackenzie from fishing on Dubh lake, 
arguing that, as riparian landowner proprietor of all of the land 
surrounding Dubh lake, Bankes held the sole right to use the surface of 
its waters. 136 Apparently Bankes had become concerned that fishermen 
on Dubh lake would frighten the newly present deer on the lake's 
banks, and therefore set aside his prior "neighborly" behavior of 
the water, or would each owner's relative use of the water depend upon the percentage of the 
bed to which he held title? 
1 29. Mackenzie v. Bankes, (1 878) 3 App. Cas. 1324, 1 324 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Scot.). 
1 30. Id 
1 3 1 .  Id at 1 324-25. 
132.  Id at 1325. 
1 3 3 .  Id 
1 34. Id 
1 3 5 .  Id At least one judge in Bankes suggested that, regardless o f  its ruling as to 
whether Bankes held the right to free access of the entire surface, he may have acquired a 
right to the water by virtue of his lengthy possession. Id at 1 345. 
1 36. Id at 1325. 
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allowing surface access to the lake. 137 Mackenzie sued, arguing that he 
and Bankes were riparian landowner proprietors on the same water 
body. 138 As such, Mackenzie sought a judicial declaration that both he 
and Bankes held a "joint right of boating, fowling, fishing, and 
exercising all other rights in or over" the entire surface of the lake. 139 
Finding that Fionn and Dubh were actually two different lakes, 
the House of Lords dismissed Mackenzie's suit. 140 The court found that 
Mackenzie, as a riparian landowner proprietor on Fionn only, had no 
right to access the surface of a wholly separate lake. 141 The dispute 
between Mackenzie and Bankes was resolved, and the opinion should 
have ended with that finding. The House of Lords went on, though, to 
engage in a relatively lengthy discussion of what the result might have 
been had the lakes instead been one water body. 142 The digression is 
important, though purely dicta, as it is perhaps the best articulation of 
the rationale behind the Scottish rule of free riparian landowner 
surface access. 
Lord Selbome, voting with the majority in Mackenzie, best 
explained the Scottish rule with regard to surface access of 
nonnavigable lakes. 143 He began by setting out the Scottish rules of bed 
ownership.144 In the absence of title documents establishing the 
contrary, a lake "surrounded by the land of a single proprietor" belongs 
solely to that proprietor. 145 Thus, when one riparian landowner on a 
nonnavigable lake owns the entirety of the riparian landowner land, yet 
neither his deed nor anyone else's declares the owner of the bed of the 
lake, the riparian landowner owns the entire bed. When there are 
multiple riparian landowners on one water body, the bed-"the solum 
or fundus of the lake"-is owned "rateably" by all. 146 To determine 
precise boundary lines, Scottish law calls for lines to be drawn from 
the center of the lake to the boundaries of the proprietor's land, just as 
1 37. Id 
1 38. Id at 1 326. 
1 39. Id at 1 324. 
140. Id at 13 36. 
1 4 1 .  Id 
1 42. Id at 1 338. 
1 43. See id at 1 336, 1340. 
1 44. See id at 1 338. 
1 45.  Id 
1 46. Id 
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with a river. 147 This rule of ownership is widely held and is perfectly 
consistent with traditional notions of property law. 148 
What makes Scottish law in this area a departure from the 
mainstream, though, is the rule the Mackenzie court goes on to 
articulate regarding surface access. Lord Selbome continued, "for 
reasons which may be presumed to be founded in part, if not wholly, 
on the irregularity of configuration, frequent in lakes," Scottish law 
does not apply the same rule with regard to the rights of "boating, 
fishing, and fowling" on lakes. 149 Riparian landowners are not 
constrained by the bed ownership rule when it comes to accessing the 
surface of lakes. The rights of boating, fishing, fowling, or any other 
surface activities "are to be enjoyed over the whole water space, by all 
the riparian landowner proprietors in common, subject (if need be) to 
judicial regulation."150 
Selbome did not offer any further explanation of the rule of free 
access other than that it is founded upon "the irregularity of 
configuration" of most lakes.151 Lord Blackburn's dissent in 
Mackenzie offered an expansion of the rationale behind this dicta 
though. 152 Blackbum noted that Scottish law (in particular, 
Macdonald) generally supports the idea that "surface rights, which 
from their nature [cannot] conveniently be exercised except jointly 
over the whole" lake, are to be viewed as held in common. 153 The 
Mackenzie court, then, offered the first justification for an emerging, 
and divergent, Scottish rule: the oddity in shape of lakes and the 
inconvenience of limiting surface access. 
Finally, in Menzies v. �ntwort/J,154 the Scottish courts had 
occasion to engage in "judicial regulation" of the common surface 
rights of multiple riparian landowners. The lake at issue in �ntworth 
(Lake Rannoch) was the same as that involved in Macdonald, litigated 
nearly fifty years prior. 155 This time, Menzies sued, requesting that a 
court step in and provide the type of judicial "regulation" the House of 
147 .  Id 
1 4 8 .  See, e.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 94-95 (explaining that the same rule obtains 
in the United States). 
1 49. Mackenzie, ( 1 878) 3 App. Cas. at 1 338.  
1 50.  Id 
1 5 1 .  Id 
1 52 .  See id at 1 340-50. 
1 53 .  Id at 1 343. 
1 54 .  ( 1 90 1 )  3 s.c. 94 1 .  
1 55 .  Likewise, Menzies acted as the plaintiff in both cases. Compare id with Menzies 
v. Macdonald, ( 1 856) L.R.H.L. Sc. 463, 463 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.). 
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Lords noted might be necessary in both Macdonald and Mackenzie.156 
By the time of the Utentworth decision, the number of riparian 
landowners with land along Lake Rannoch had grown from three to 
six (with the lake frontage owned by these riparian landowners varying 
from about 1 50 yards to just over ten miles157), several hotels had been 
built along the lake, and the number of boats using the lake had 
increased from approximately nineteen to fifty-one.158 Menzies argued 
that the increased activity was damaging, and even threatening to 
destroy altogether, the trout fishing on the lake.159 He sought a 
judgment limiting the number of boats on the lake to sixteen, allocated 
among riparian landowners according to their respective lake 
frontage.160 
The Court of Session161 denied Menzies' request for intervention 
and dismissed his suit.162 The court first explained that it would refuse 
to regulate use of the lake in the absence of proof that the right to fish 
on it was being "materially injured or destroyed."163 While Menzies 
produced proof that the fish caught on Lake Rannoch at the time of the 
suit were generally smaller in size than those caught years before, he 
did not produce evidence that fewer fish were caught on the lake at the 
time of suit as compared to some prior point.164 The court found that 
proof of the reduced weight of individual fish did not satisfy plaintiff's 
burden of proof.165 
Utentworth is significant for its recognition of the emerging 
Scottish doctrine of free access, and its dicta with regard to what 
exactly judicial regulation of that free access might look like. 
Although the court denied Menzies' request that it regulate the surface 
1 56. Wentworth, ( 1 90 1 )  3 S.C. at 941 .  
1 57. Id at 94 1 ,  943. 
1 58. Id at 943. 
1 59. Only the right to fish for trout was questioned in �ntoorth. Scottish law 
provides specially for rights to fish for salmon. Id at 955.  The right of salmon fishing in 
Scotland is a separate feudal estate. Id Thus, unlike that of trout fishing, the right of salmon 
fishing does not flow merely from ownership of lands bordering a river or lake. 3 WALKER, 
supra note 1 2 1 ,  at 1 13. 
1 60. Wentoorth, (190 1 )  3 S.C. at 942. 
1 6 1 .  The Court of Session is the highest ranking civil court of appeal located in 
Scotland. MAxWELL, supra note 1 1 9, at 3. It is not, however, the court of last resort for 
Scottish cases. Appeals from the Court of Session could be heard by the House of Lords 
(which maintained a physical location only in England) until 2005, and by a new Supreme 
Court after that. See MAxWELL, supra note 1 19, at 262-63. 
1 62 .  �ntworth, ( 1 90 1 )  3 S.C. at 941 .  
1 63.  Id at 955. 
1 64. Id at 956. 
1 65 .  Id 
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use of the riparian landowners, the case serves a s  yet another judicial 
recognition that Macdonald set out a "joint right" and that courts may 
need to interfere in the case of abuse of the right.166 The Jlentworth 
court noted that the j oint right articulated in Macdonald was 
"consistent with the dicta on the subject in other cases," namely 
Mackenzie. 161 Thus, by the time of Jlentworth, the highest Scottish 
civil court considered the rule of free access to be the law in Scotland. 
And though the majority did not reach the question of what type 
of judicial regulation it might provide for the owners of Lake Rannoch, 
Lord M'Laren's concurrence espoused a theory of just what sort of 
judicial regulation a court could undertake. 168 M'Laren argued that, 
even if Menzies could have shown an injury sufficient to necessitate 
judicial regulation, the relief he sought would not have been possible.169 
M'Laren read Macdonald to provide all riparian landowners with 
equal rights of use over the entire surface of the lake, with no regard to 
their percentage of riparian landowner ownership.110 The Jlentworth 
court, therefore, could not have made "an order allocating the use of 
[Lake Rannoch] in proportion to 'frontage'," as Menzies requested.111 
Such a decision, in M'Laren's view, would not have comported with 
the House of Lords' judgment in Macdonald112 
M' Laren 's concurrence, then, is more than just a recognition of a 
strong Scottish rule of free riparian landowner access to the entire 
surface of nonnavigable lakes. It is an amplification of it to provide for 
equal percentage (and not merely frontage-based) use. The importance 
of that amplification, in this context, is that it serves to illustrate how 
well entrenched the basic rule of free riparian landowner access to the 
entirety of lake surfaces was by the time of Jlentworth. 
After the decision in H-entwoJth, the new and unusual Scottish 
doctrine was well-recognized and its parameters nearly fully 
developed. The rule of free access was born, not of the civil law, but of 
the courts of Scotland.113 
1 66. Id at 947. 
167. Id (citing Mackenzie v. Bankes, ( 1 878) 3 App. Cas. 1 324 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Scot.)). 
168. Id at 957. 
169. Id 
1 70. See 1d 
1 7 1 .  Id 
1 72. Id 
1 73. If the rule of free access stems from Scottish roots, can we not call it a "civil law 
rule"? What does it mean to be a "civil law rule"? The question is one to which there is no 
clear answer. But the simplest one, I think, is that to be a "civil law rule " the rule must come 
from a civilian source. As a jurisdiction with a civilian (or, at least, a mi�ed) legal system, but 
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This series of Scottish cases highlights an important point about 
the origin of the Scottish rule of surface access. To appreciate fully the 
rationale behind the Scottish rule, it is necessary to first understand a 
bit about the Scottish rule of riparian landowner access on 
nonnavigable rivers. Though it seems counterintuitive, the Scots did 
not allow the free access to riparian landowners along a nonnavigable 
river that they provided to those on a nonnavigable lake.174 Because the 
running waters of a river are generally viewed as more transient and 
incapable of containment or possession than those of a lake, there may 
be some rational justification for providing free access to riparian 
landowners on a river while denying it to those on a lake. Any logical 
grounding for the opposite rule-free riparian landowner access on 
lakes, but not on rivers-is untenable. Yet the Scots have adopted 
exactly such a rule. 
This just emphasizes the importance of the Macdonald, 
Mackenzie, and ltentworth decisions. The series demonstrates that 
the rule of free access to the surface of nonnavigable lakes has its 
genesis nowhere but in the Scottish legal system, and that it was born 
out of the Scots' desire to simplify the problems of boundary 
demarcation and enforcement on those water bodies.115 
Essentially, the Scots adopted and developed the rule solely as a 
matter of convenience. It is neither a rule borrowed from a civil law 
source nor a rule with its primary basis in any civilian notions of the 
ownership or use of water. It was both generated and elaborated upon 
by the Scots, merely as a convenient distortion of the typical rules of 
surlace access. 
C. The American Incorporation of the Scottish Interpretation 
While the precise parameters of the rule of free access were still 
being articulated and narrowed in Scotland, the doctrine made its way 
to the United States. The door to its application here, surprisingly, was 
opened by the United States Supreme Court in its 1891 decision in 
without a civil code, Scotland's law is civilian only insofar as it is Roman. See S.A. Bayitch, 
Codification in Modem Times, in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 3, at 177-
79; F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 26 (Greenwood Press 1977) 
(1955). And Roman law provided no rule of free access, nor any basis for such a rule. See 
discussion supra Part 11.C. l .c. This is an idiosyncratic Scottish generation, not a "civilian" 
rule. 
174. See Mackenzie v. Bankes, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1324, 1338-40 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Scot.). 
175. Id at 1338. 
928 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 80:90 1 
Hardin v. Jordan. 1 16 Interestingly, Hardin did not set out a general rule 
of free access to the surface of a nonnavigable lake for recreational 
use. Indeed, surface access was not even the issue under consideration 
in Hardin. Rather, the Court was called upon to determine the bounds 
of bed ownership for litigants with property bordering on a 
nonnavigable lake. 1 11 But loose dicta by the Hardin Court regarding 
recreational use imported the Scottish rule into the United States and 
compounded the problem by incorrectly suggesting a civilian source 
for the rule.118 The mistake has since persisted in a long line of 
jurisprudence. 1 19 In short, the considerable confusion of American 
courts with regard to the authorities supporting and the source of the 
rule of free riparian landowner access was born of the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Hardin. 
1 .  The Hardin Decision 
The plaintiff in Hardin brought an ejectment action, seeking a 
declaration that she was the rightful possessor of a tract of land 
bordering and underneath a portion of the waters of a small lake.180 
Plaintiff's title described her ownership to extend "along the margin of 
the lake"; 18 1  thus, her title did not describe her ownership as including 
any portion of the bed of the lake. Plaintiff sought to oust the 
defendant from an area of land covered by water, and, thus, outside of 
the land strictly described in the plaintiff's title, but still between the 
plaintiff's dry boundary and the center of the lake. In support of this 
attempt, plaintiff argued that as a riparian landowner, the boundaries of 
her ownership did not stop at the water's edge, but rather, extended to 
the center of the lake.182 In essence, the issue in Hardin was "the effect 
of [the plaintiff's] title in reference to the lake and the bed of the lake 
in front of the lands actually described in the grant."183 In other words, 
does a landowner with a title establishing ownership of land abutting a 
1 76 .  1 40 U.S. 37 1 , 3 7 1  ( 1 89 1 ). 
1 77.  Id at 372. 
I 7X. Sct' 1d at 390-9 1 .  
1 79 .  A number of jurisdictions that have considered the question have either 
referenced the Hardin decision or used the inept label "civil law rule." See, e.g., Wehby v. 
Turp111. 7 10  So. 2d 1 243, 1 249 (Ala. 1 998); Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 
634-35 (Conn. 2005); Lanier v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, Inc., 322 S.E.2d 494, 496 (Ga. 
1 984): Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass'n, 526 N.E.2d 1 54, 1 56-57 (Ill. 1988); 
Sanders v. De Rose, 1 9 1  N.E. 33 1 ,  333 (Ind. 1 934 ). 
1 80. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 372. 
1 8 1 .  Id at 374. 
1 82 .  Id at 379. 
1 83.  Id at 380. 
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lake also own a portion of the bed of that lake (in the absence of 
specific title to the bed in another)? 
The Supreme Court first noted that ownership of some portion of 
the bed of a water body, even where a landowner's title prescribes 
specific boundaries that include no portion of the bed, is not 
inconsistent with general principles of property or boundary law. 184 
Survey lines that reference a water body exist "not for the purpose of 
limiting the title of the grantee to such" boundaries, but to "ascertain[] 
the exact quantity of the upland to be charged for."185 Thus, it is typical 
for a surveyor to reference a water body as a property's boundary line 
merely for convenience and the necessity of establishing some stable 
line, all the while intending that the true boundary be within the 
waters. 186 
Finding no precedent for a determination of the bounds of 
ownership on a nonnavigable lake, the Supreme Court turned to prior 
jwisprudence involving rivers and streams.181 The English common 
law clearly provided that landowners with property bordering on 
nonnavigable rivers also owned the bed of the water body, up to the 
thread of the stream, even where their titles described the river as the 
bounds of their ownership. 188 The Court then noted that circumstances 
in the United States (particularly in Illinois, the state around which the 
Hardin dispute centered) were not so different as to justify a different 
rule from that applied in England.189 Moreover, the Court found no 
reason to distinguish between rivers and lakes for the purpose of 
providing a rule of title to the bed. 190 In either case, the water 
"constitutes one of the advantages of [the land's] situation, and a 
material part of its value, and enters largely into the consideration for 
acquiring [the land]. Hence the presumption is that a grant of land 
thus bounded is intended to include the contiguous land covered by 
water."191 The Court, therefore, held · that the plaintiff owned the 
portion of the bed of the lake extending from the dry border, as 
described in her title, out to the center of the lake. 192 
1 84. See id at 379. 
1 85.  Id at 380. 
1 86. Id; see also FRANK E. CLARK, CLARK ON SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES § 25. 14, at 
867 (Walter G. Robillard & Lane J. Bouman eds., 6th ed. 1992) (expanding upon the process 
of surveying property). 
1 87. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 387-88. 
1 88. Id 
1 89. Id at 386. 
190. See id at 391 .  
191 .  Id 
192. Id at 401 -02. 
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a. Importing the Scottish Rule Through Dicta 
The problem in Hardin is that, in discussing the rule of ownership 
of the bed of rivers, particularly while trying to explain that the English 
rule regarding rivers should also be applied to determine ownership of 
the bed of lakes, the Court describes Scottish law.193 The comparison 
is, at first, helpful, because it serves to explain why the English bed 
ownership rule was never extended, in that country, to lakes: There 
simply are not enough lakes or ponds of substantial size to prompt 
litigation.194 The majority of sizeable interior waters in England are 
rivers.195 Scotland, on the other hand, has a well-developed law 
regarding private ownership of lakes, necessitated by their prevalence 
there.196 The Hardin Court, then, appropriately notes that the Scottish 
rule of ownership of nonnavigable lake beds is that multiple riparian 
landowner proprietors own "the space inclosed by lines drawn from 
the boundaries of each property usque ad mediwn fl1um aquae [up to 
the middle of the stream r1 being deemed appurtenant to the land of 
that proprietor, exactly as in the common case of a river."198 
The sentence and citations immediately following that legal 
principle, though, are what wreak havoc. The Court continues: 
But as to the rights of boating, fishing and fowling . . .  [t]hese are to be 
enjoyed over the whole water space by all the riparian proprietors in 
common, subject (if need be) to judicial regulation. [Citing Mackenzie 
v. Bankes, ( 1 878) 3 .  App. Cas. 1324, 1338 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Scot.).] See, also, to the same purport, Burge, Col. & For. Law, vol. 3, 
p. 425; Justinian's Digest, lib. 8, tit. 3, f 23, § I .  And centuries before 
Justinian, Cicero spoke of the many lands, houses, lakes, ponds, places 
and possessions confiscated by Sylla and conferred upon his own 
favorites. Agra. Law, Orat. 3, c. 2:7. 199 
The Court's description of the Scottish rule allowing riparian 
landowners mutual access to the entire surface of a lake for 
recreational purposes is certainly unnecessary to its resolution of the 
controversy at hand. The dispute hinged upon ownership of a portion 
of the bed of a lake, not upon whether the parties were each entitled to 
access the surface of the body. But the Court's mention of the Scottish 
1 93 .  See 10. at 39 1 .  
1 94. Id at 388. 
1 95 .  Id 
1 96. Id at 390. 
1 97 .  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. l990). 
1 98. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 390. 
1 99 .  Id (internal quotations omitted). 
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rule served to import that line of cases into the United States, 
unnecessarily, and with no explanation of the rationale behind or the 
soundness of the rule. 
b. Compounding the Problem with Erroneous Citation 
Moreover, to the extent the Hardin Court cites the works of 
Burge, Justinian, and Cicero to support the proposition that riparian 
landowner ownership grants the privilege of use for boating or fishing 
on the entire surface of the lake, such citation is simply incorrect. The 
Court compounds the problem of importing the idiosyncratic Scottish 
rule by suggesting that other authorities support such a rule. To the 
extent the authorities the Court mentions are civilian-and thus imply 
the existence of a civilian source for the rule of free access-the 
erroneous citation is particularly egregious. 
British jurist William Burge 's work on late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century colonial law simply states that "[l]akes surrounded 
by grounds of various proprietors are common property."200 While this 
might be authority for the idea that multiple landowners with titles 
described as bounding on a lake own the bed "in common" to the 
center, it does not suggest that colonial law gave each riparian 
landowner proprietor free access to the entire surface of the body. The 
two issues are independent,201 and Burge did not speak to the latter. 
The section of Justinian's Digest cited by the Hardin Court 
provides even less support for a rule of mutual riparian landowner 
access to the entire surface of a lake. In defining and detailing the 
rules of predial servitudes,202 the Digest provides: "If there is a 
permanent lake on your land, a servitude of boating across it can be 
created, to allow access to a neighboring estate."203 The passage in no 
way suggests that surface access to the entire lake exists in all riparian 
200. 3 WILLIAM BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS: 
GENERALLY, AND IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE LAW OF ENGLAND 425 
(1 838). 
20 1 .  Lord Hale's prominent treatise on English water law, for instance, explains that 
"[ f]resh rivers . . .  do of common right belong to the owners of the soil adjacent," but that this 
"common right'' means only that multiple riparian landowners on a river own its bed to the 
center line. Matthew Hale, De Jure Mans, in A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW 
RELATING THERETO 370 (Stuart A. Moore ed., 3d ed. 1888). The "common right" has no 
bearing on surface rights. Indeed, Hale noted that a riparian landowner would hold the right 
to fish over the entire surface of a river only if he owned the land on both sides of it. Id 
202. Predial servitudes are akin to easements in the common law. WW BUCKLAND & 
ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 127 (2d ed. 
1952). 
203. DIG. 8.3.23 . 1  (Paul, Sabinus, bk. 1 6). 
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landowners. To the contrary, the suggestion that a servitude can be 
crel1ted to provide such a right indicates that the position of the Digest 
was that no mutual right of surf ace access existed in the absence of the 
creation of a servitude. 
Cicero's orations on Roman law and politics likewise lend no 
credence to the mutual surface access rule the Hardin court draws into 
American jurisprudence. In delivering an oration on the need for the 
development of and debate over a body of Roman agrarian law around 
the year 62 B.C., Cicero sought to stem criticism that he opposed 
agrarian law because it would deprive him of property granted him and 
other elites by the then-ruling Roman general, Lucius Cornelius 
Sylla.�°" Arguing that Sylla gave more to private parties than any prior 
ruler, Cicero asked his listeners to remember what "has been given, or 
assigned or sold, or granted by public authority, whether lands, or 
houses, or lakes, or marshes, or sites, or properties."205 This is 
obviously no authority for any rule of access to the surface of a lake. 
At most-stretching the meaning nearly to its breaking point-it 
might be considered authority for the idea that lakes were susceptible 
of private ownership (by grant from the political authority of the time) 
as early as 62 B. C. 
Of course, it is possible that the Court meant to cite these 
authorities in support of its prior point: in the absence of any title 
documents indicating otherwise, riparian landowners take the bed of a 
lake to the center. It would, at least, be easier to characterize the 
comments of Burge and Cicero as supporting that point, though even 
that requires an extremely generous interpretation. The placement of 
the citation immediately after a discussion of the Scottish right of full 
surface use in all riparian landowners belies that intent though. And 
regardless of the Hardin Court's intent in citing Burge, Justinian, and 
Cicero, subsequent American judicial decisions have interpreted the 
opinion to stand as authority for the proposition that a rule of full 
surface access stems from the civil law.206 
c. Ignoring Other Relevant Roman Authorities 
Final ly, the Supreme Court ignored relevant Roman authorities in 
favor of erroneous citation to Burge, one provision of Justinian's 
Digest.. and Cicero. The Court was clearly looking for some Roman 
204. 2 CICERO, THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 257 (C.D. Yonge B.A. ed., 
trans., George Bell & Sons 1 890). 
205. Id at 259. 
206. See. e.g., Wehby v. Turpin, 7 1 0  So. 2d 1243, 1 249 (Ala. 1998). 
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source for the rule of free access; otherwise, it would not have 
bothered to cite the works of Justinian and Cicero. But it failed to fully 
consider the quintessential Roman law authorities. Had the Court 
properly considered Roman law, it would have concluded that nothing 
there supports the Scottish rule of free access. The Hardin Court's 
failure to properly consider relevant Roman law merely pronounces its 
mistake in citation. Without a full and accurate discussion of Roman 
law, the discussion of the Scottish cases and the erroneous c itations 
leave the reader-and left a number of American courts-with the 
flawed impression that the rule of free access is one that stems from 
the civil law. 
The paramount sources of Roman law-Justinian's Diges� the 
previously discussed compilation of the writings of ancient Roman 
jurists,201 and Justinian's Institutes, a sixth-century textbook of Roman 
law aimed at law students208-say nothing specific about a riparian 
landowner's right to access the surface of a nonnavigable lake for 
recreational purposes. In fact, Justinian's Digest and Institutes say 
very little about water at all. 209 Nevertheless, they are considered the 
foundation of all modem water law.210 Some even argue that the 
Romans far exceeded any modem society in terms of their 
understanding of the important issues and in their ability to develop 
responsive legal principles surrounding water.2 1 1  
At the time of the preparation of the Digest and Institutes, there 
were, of course, no jet-skis or motorboats; even with more archaic 
devices, water use as "recreation" was virtually unheard of. Other 
nonconsumptive uses of water were important to the Romans though. 
Fishing (along with boating, for this purpose) and bathing were of 
particular concern. 212 So it is that the Digest and Institutes contain just 
a few provisions that arguably relate to use of the surface of water 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57. 
208. MOUSOURAKJS, supra note 58, at 390. 
209. See ROMAN WATER LAW, supra note 6, § 10, at 25-26. 
2 1 0. ''All the Civil Law of recent centuries concerning water comes from the old 
Roman Law . . . .  " Id § 2 ,  at 16. 
2 1 1 .  
It will surprise any one who reads the translation of the Roman water law to see 
how perfectly and fully they understood the whole question. They had worked out 
every problem, and we may safely say that they understood the subject as well as 
we do to-day, and no one can say that the old Romans did not bring to their law of 
water a common sense and equity not exceeded by our courts to-day. 
Id § 9, at 240. 
2
.
12.  See, e.g., THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1 .2 (Thomas Cooper ed., John s. 
Voorhies 1 852) [hereinafter INSTITUTES]. 
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bodies.213 Not one of these provisions lends any support to the idea of 
free access to the surface of a nonnavigable lake by all riparian 
landowners. 
The sections of the Digest and Institutes relating to 
nonconsumptive uses of waterways might be collected under three 
basic headings. First, there are provisions laying out the fundamental 
principles of ownership and use of all water bodies, including rivers 
and the sea.214 Second, there are particular provisions regarding use of 
rivers, especially for fishing.215 And third, there are a few scant 
provisions speaking of lakes.216 
The basic principles underlying the framework of Roman water 
law can be found in Justinian's Institutes, section 2. 1 . 1 :  
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, nmning 
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; no man therefore 
is prohibited from approaching any part of the seashore, whilst he 
abstains from damaging farms, monuments, edifices, etc. which are not 
in common as the sea is.211 
The tenet that there are some things, including "running water" and 
"the sea," which are not susceptible of private ownership is carried 
forward in the modem law of almost every civilian nation.218 Indeed, it 
has long been the common law of England as well.219 Both traditions 
recognize that the transient and uncontainable nature of the waters of 
the high sea and those flowing in rivers simply does not lend itself to 
concepts of ownership.220 Thus, these waters are "common things,"�2 1  
owned by no one and subject to free use by everyone.222 Landowners 
with property bordering on the sea or on rivers, of course, are included. 
213. See infra notes 214-2 17, 223-226, 228-230 and accompanying text. 
214. See, e.g., INSTITUTES, supm note 212, at 2 . 1 . l .  
215. See, e.g., id at 2. 1 .2;  DIG. 43. 14. l  (illpian, Edict, bk. 68); DIG. 43. 1 2 . 1  (Ulpian, 
Edict, bk. 68). 
. 
216. See, e.g., DIG. 43. 14. 1 (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68); DIG. 8.3.23. l (Paul, Sabinus, bk. 
1 5). 
217. �STITUTES, supra note 212, at 2. 1 . 1 ;  see also DIG. 1 .8.2 . 1  (Marcian, Institutes, 
bk. 3) ("And mdeed by natural law the following belong in common to all men: air, flowing 
water, and the sea . . . .  "). 
218. See 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CNIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY 38-42 (4th ed. 2001)  (discussing French, Louisianan, German, and Greek law). 
219. JOSlillA GETZLER,A HrSTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 1 75 (2004). 220. Id at 174-75; BUCKLAND & MCNAIR, supra note 202, at 97. 
22 � . See �'.'"· Crv. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2005); WARE, supra note 6, § 395, at 14 1-42 (translating provisions of the early Spanish Siete Partidas). 
222. See, e.g., LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2005). 
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Under these most basic Roman water law principles, they have access 
to the entirety of the surface of the sea or river on which they border.223 
The Romans went even further in protecting the rights of the 
people to make nonconsumptive uses of rivers. Justinian's Institutes 
expressly recognized the right of fishing in rivers to be a right shared 
by all men. 224 As a corollary to that right came the obligation of 
landowners along a river to refrain from using any force to prohibit 
members of the public from making use of the river, or from acting in 
a way that would otherwise impede navigation. 225 And the obligation 
of the riparian landowner went beyond merely interfering with 
navigation; the landowner was also required to suffer use of his bank­
his private property-incidental to that navigation. 226 Again, if such 
rights to navigate, fish in, and use the banks of a river were held by the 
general public at Roman law, riparian landowners, as members of that 
public, certainly held at least these rights. 
The Romans did not extend the same protection of public use to 
lakes, though. At Roman law, lakes were not common things. They 
were distinguished from rivers and the high seas-things insusceptible 
of private ownership by their nature.227 Lakes, on the other hand, were 
capable of being privately owned, and the public's rights to use the 
waters of a lake for fishing or any other purpose extended only to 
public lakes. 228 Private lakes were outside the domain of public use. 
Thus, Roman citizens were not entitled to fish in others' private lakes. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Digest says nothing about 
the rights of riparian landowners sharing borders on a nonnavigable 
lake-as opposed to the general public-to fish and boat over its entire 
surface.229 But it strongly suggests that these riparian landowners were 
not entitled to free access to the entirety of the surface: "If there is a 
permanent lake on your land, a servitude of boating across it can be 
created, to allow access to a neighboring estate."230 The need to create a 
servitude allowing riparian landowners access to neighboring estates 
223. See DIG. 1 .8.4 (Marcian, Institutes, bk. 3) ("No one, therefore, is prohibited from 
going on to the seashore to fish . . . .  "). 
224. INSTITIITES, supra note 2 12, at 2 . 1 .2 ("Rivers and ports are public; hence the right 
of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common."). 
225 .  DIG. 43 . 1 4.l  (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68). 
226. Id at 43. 12 . 1  (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68). 
227. See BUCKLAND & MCNAIR, supra. note 202, at 97. 
. �28. DIG. 43. 1 4. 1 .2 (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68) ("If the [lake] should be private, the mterd1ct [not to use force against a person navigating the body] does not apply."). 
229. See supra notes 216-2 17, 223, 225-226, 228 and accompanying text. 
230. DIG. 8.3.23. 1 (Paul, Sabinus, bk. 1 5) .  
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simply would not exist i f  all riparian landowners held a right to use the 
surface of the lake on which they bordered. 
Nothing in the Digest or Institutes specifically gives, or even 
suggests, that there exists in a landowner with property bordering on a 
nonnavigable lake the right to access and use its entire surface for 
fishing, boating, bathing, or any other purpose. That Roman law did 
support the existence of those rights on rivers is inapposite. The waters 
of a river, as "running waters," have long been distinguished from the 
more contained, possibly even stagnant, waters of a lake. Thus, while 
the entirety of the surface waters of a river were, at Roman law, subject 
to public use, and, therefore, the use of the riparian landowners as well, 
the waters of a lake were not subject to this same use. Plainly, an 
analysis of Roman law just does not yield any support for the 
proposition that riparian landowners share the mutual right of free 
access to the surface of nonnavigable lakes.231 
The Hardin Court should have come to this same conclusion in 
analyzing the one provision of Justinian's Digest it did cite. The Court 
did engage in at least some study of Roman law to support its dicta 
regarding surface access. But had it considered Roman law more fully, 
it should have concluded that Roman law does not support the Scottish 
rule. 
The Hardin Court wmecessarily imported the Scottish doctrine of 
free access, which is contrary to traditionally held notions of the 
meaning of private ownership, as embodied in cujus est solum. The 
importation occurred with no critical analysis, and through dicta. m 
23 1 .  If one doubts the efficacy of an analysis of Roman law to prove any conclusions 
about the "civilian" heritage of a given legal rule, see ROMAN WATER LAW, supra note 6, § 2, 
at 16 (''The basis of all the Civil Law which comes to any state . . .  whether directly or 
indirectly, is the law of imperial Rome."), one need only turn to an analysis of the substantive 
water law of any of the great number of jurisdictions living under the civil law. As discussed 
supra.text accompanying notes 1 12-1 14, the principle cujus est solwn has retained its place in 
the civilian tradition through the centuries and remains to this day a codified principle in 
France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Argentina, and Japan. And while some civilian jurisdictions 
still admit of an exception to that principle in favor of free use of "running waters," which 
cannot be privately owned, see, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 450 (2005), they do not allow public, 
or even mutual riparian landowners, access to the surface of nonnavigable lakes. See J.C. 
Senter, Jr., Comment, Ownership of the Beds of Navigable Lakes, 21 TuL. L. REv. 454, 454 
(1947). 
232. 
Although it is the duty of courts of justice to decide questions of fact on principle if 
they can, they must take care in such formulation of principles to limit themselves 
to
. 
th: require?1ents of the case in hand. That is to say, they must not lay down 
pru:ic1ples "".hich are not required for the due decision of the particular case, or 
which are wider than is necessary for this purpose. 
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That misstep was then multiplied by erroneous citation and incomplete 
consideration of the sources of the Scottish rule, which is especially 
problematic for the misimpression it gives about the origins and 
history of the rule. In any event, with Hardin, the Supreme Court 
opened the door to a rule of free access. Appellate courts around the 
country soon came calling. 
2. Subsequent Judicial Application of the Hardin Dicta 
The mistake made in Hardin quickly proved to be an influential 
one. State courts resolving disputes over surface access to 
nonnavigable lakes searched far and wide for precedent, and 
considered the Hardin dicta sufficient. 233 A Texas appellate court 
seeking to resolve a 1935 dispute among riparian landowners over 
fishing on a nonnavigable lake, for example, found Hardin an 
authority on the question.234 The Texas court cited Hardin in a manner 
telling of the quick infiltration of its dicta: 
It may be conceded as a general proposition . . . that . . . a riparian 
landowner whose land abuts on a nonnavigable lake . . .  impliedly owns 
the land under the water to the center of the lake and that all riparian 
owners whose lands abut on such a lake have a right to the joint use of 
the entire lake for fishing and boating.235 
Thus, Hardin was generally accepted as having promulgated a rule of 
free access by 1935. 
Shortly afterward, that rule was being called a civil law rule. In a 
1959 decision, the Florida Supreme Court noted that ''under the 
common law doctrine only the owner could use the water overlying his 
fee, while under the doctrine of the civil law the whole lake could be 
used by any owner of a part of the bottom subject, of course, to the 
rights of those in like situation."236 The false labels have been carried 
EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE:  THE PHlLOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 433 (rev. 
ed. 1 978) (quoting John Salmond, The Theory of Judicial Precedents, 1 6  L.Q. R.Ev. 376, 388 
(1 900)). 
233. While an appellate court is certainly free to reject the application of dicta or to 
view it as merely persuasive authority, the danger is that "many judges will be disinclined to 
examine prior decisions alleged to be relevant with razor-blade sharpness and discernment in 
order to determine whether the principle laid down by the prior court was, in the exact form 
in which it was phrased, truly necessary for the determination of the case." Id at 435; see 
al�o K.�. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS Sruoy 67-69 (1960) 
(discussmg the role of precedent in a judge's decision). 
234. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W2d 127, 1 3 0  (Tex. Civ. App. 1 935). 
235. Id 
236. Duval v. Thomas, 1 14 So. 2d 79 1 ,  793 (Fla. 1959) (internal citations omitted). 
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forward and persist even today, with the Connecticut Supreme Court's 
2005 Buccino decision serving as the most recent example. 237 
Perhaps most disturbing though is the effe�t the Hardin error and 
its subsequent heralding as a civil law rule have had on judicial 
decision-making. A few courts have considered the potential rules 
without regard to their labels, and apparently with due regard to their 
policies and effects.238 But others have adopted the so-called common 
law rule merely for its purported origin. The Alabama Supreme Court, 
for example, in itehby v. Turpin, was called upon to determine the 
surface access rights of riparian landowners on an artificial lake.239 
The court explained the civil law rule, but rejected it in favor of a rule 
of restricted access.240 The superficial rationale with which the court 
supported its decision highlights' the real problem with the Hardin 
error. The itehby court first noted that "Alabama is a common law 
state" and then concluded that, as a result, it was "bound to follow the 
majority common law rule."241 
The itehby court's questionable rationale for adopting the 
common law rule shows the need to rectify the mistake made years 
ago-beginning with the Scottish line of free access cases and 
continuing with Hardin and its progeny. Courts should certainly strive 
to solve their litigants' problems with a thorough examination of all 
possible solutions. The itehby court should not be faulted for 
considering rules of both free and restricted access. But appellate 
courts, including itehby and Buccino can, and should, be faulted for 
lazy reliance on labels that are incorrect. There is, in fact, no civil law 
rule of surface access that differs from the purported common law 
rule. Courts must begin recognizing that and issuing opinions that 
reflect a truly reasoned decision as to what they believe is the most 
desirable rule of riparian landowner surface access. 
237. Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 634-35 (Conn. 2005). 
238. See, e.g., Beach v. Hayner, 1 73 N.W. 487, 488-89 (Mich. 19 19); Johnson v. 
Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689, 695-96 (Minn. 1960). 
239. 710 So. 2d 1 243, 1 246 (Ala. 1998). 
240. Id at 1 247-49. 
241 .  Id at 1 249. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina recently issued a similarly 
careless decision in Mites Mill Colony, Inc. v. Williams, 609 S.E.2d 8 1 1 ,  820 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2005). The court adopted the "common law rule;' after noting that South Carolina "generally 
hews closely to the common law" and that its courts "when confronted with a decision 
whether to follow a common law approach or follow a civil law rule . . .  -absent any other 
considerations-would generally follow the common law rule." Id 
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III. DEBUNKING THE MYTH 
It is time for this ancient false dichotomy to finally be laid to rest. 
The need to stop the persistence of the incorrect labels may seem, at 
first, superficial. The problem is solved, after all, by merely changing 
the nomenclature. The rule allowing free riparian landowner surface 
access should no longer be called a civil law rule. It must be done, 
though, for it is an important step towards preserving judicial integrity 
and fostering greater understanding of the differences between the 
common and civil law systems. 
A. Recogmzing That �Are Truly Children of the Same Parents 
Despite what the labels of common law rule and civil law rule 
suggest, the truth is that there is no difference between the systems 
insofar as a rule of surface access for riparian landowners goes. Both 
systems' rules can be traced to the same ancestor: a Latin maxim of 
civilian origin. So, both traditions follow the civil law rule. Or, if you 
prefer, the civil law rule is the conunon law rule, and vice versa. The 
rule governing surface access for riparian landowners on nonnavigable 
water bodies in both the common and civil law traditions comes from 
the doctrine of cujus est solum, as articulated by ancient commentators 
on Roman law. 
There is, then, no civil law rule of free surface access to 
nonnavigable water bodies. The civil law rule was and is cujus est 
solum. And under that rule, a riparian landowner on a nonnavigable 
lake may make use of the water's surface only above bed he owns; any 
other unauthorized use is an interference with his fellow riparian 
landowner's right to exclusive dominion and control over his land-a 
trespass. 
It is true that Scotland has a rule of free access. But to call the 
rule invented by the Scots "civilian" is a mistake, and a serious one, for 
it serves to perpetuate a myth about the difference between common 
and civil law systems that is false. We should view the Scottish rule 
for what it is: a self-generated solution to a perceived problem that 
plagues all jurisdictions trying to resolve the question of surface access 
by riparian landowners-that of articulating a rule that can be 
realistically complied with, given the difficulties of determining 
precise boundaries when water is involved. The Scots chose free 
surface access for riparian landowners as the solution to the problem. 
The solution is certainly a pragmatic, and perhaps even laudable one, 
but is not a civilian one. It is directly contrary to the ancient civilian 
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principle of cujus est solum and, indeed, requires one to set aside that 
doctrine (at least in this context) altogether. 
B A Modest Proposal" Renaming the Rules 
There is a simple solution to the problem. We must just begin 
using terminology that properly characterizes the rules. We might call 
the rule allowing free access "the Scottish rule," and the rule giving a 
riparian landowner exclusive dominion of the waters overlying his bed 
''the Roman rule." We might refer to them as the "traditional" and 
"modern" rules, or the rules of "free access" and "exclusive 
dominion." Nearly anything will do, anything, that is, but the inept 
and erroneous labels, "civil law rule" and "common law rule." 
C. The Necessity of Recognizing and Correcting the Error 
This is not, though, merely a petty point of semantics. The real 
problem with the erroneous labels is twofold. First, the error stands as 
an obstacle to judicial transparency. Without transparency, some of the 
most significant values of judicial decision-making, including 
accessibility and consistency, fall. Judicial integrity is weakened in the 
process. 
Even more importantly, the erroneous labels say something about 
the difference between the common and civil law systems that is 
untrue. The perceived-and flawed-notion of a difference on this 
issue of water access is just one example of the perpetuation of the 
myth that the true distinction between the systems is in their 
substantive legal rules. It is important that this misimpression be 
corrected, because recognizing that the common and civil law are one 
and the same, at least on this score, may help us get closer to 
discovering and benefiting from our true differences. 
1 .  Fostering Judicial Transparency 
Correcting the two-century-old error is important because the 
error stymies judicial transparency, and, thus, integrity. Most scholars 
agree that a court best serves the interests of justice when it not only 
articulates its ultimate decision, but also details the logic behind and 
reasons for that decision in an open manner. 242 Transparency is 
242. See, e.g, Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: 
A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 1239, 13 13  n.348 (2002) (''Although scholars agree on the value of judicial 
transparency[,] they disagree over how best to achieve it."). 
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necessary to make law fully accessible and, at least in common law 
jurisdictions,243 to allow judicial decisions to effectively serve as 
precedent. 244 Moreover, values such as consistency and accountability 
suffer when courts do not fully and accurately describe their 
• 245 reasorung. 
All too often, though, courts issue opinions similar to those in 
llehbj46 and Buccino,241 relying on authorities and labels without a 
critical analysis of their accuracy.248 Such judicial laziness is serious, 
but its negative effects pale in comparison with those created by 
"judicial reliance on . . .  rhetoric to disguise interpretive priorities" or 
policies. 249 Whichever misstep is being made by courts on the issue of 
riparian landowner surface access, it deserves correction. Courts 
should choose to adopt whichever rule best serves the citizens of their 
states, but to do so with a full exploration of those policies and an 
acknowledgement of them as the basis for their decisions. Relying, 
243. The problem is less severe, at least in theory, in civilian jurisdictions, which do 
not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. Civilian judges are not bound by a single judicial 
decision, but only by jurisprudence constante, a long line of judicial decisions interpreting a 
legislative provision in the same way. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law 
Tradition: Archaic or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century.� 63 LA. L. REv. 1, 6 (2002). 
Today though, "[t]here is an open clash between the civilian theory . . .  Gurisprudence is only 
a secondary source of law . . .  ) and the realist's empirical observation that even a single 
decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana binds every lower court to follow it." Vernon 
Valentine Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: Histoncal Debates 
and Contemporary Evaluation of French Influence on Louisiana CiVJ1 Law, 63 LA. L. REv. 
1067, 1 1 18 n. 148 (2002). 
244. See Gilbert S. Merritt, The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 5 1  Omo ST. L.J. 1385, 1393-94 (1990); Molot, supra note 242, at 1321-22.  
245. See Merritt, supra note 244, at 1 393-94; see also Bradley T. King, Note, 
"Through Fault of Their 01¥11"-Applying Bonner Mall s Extraordinary Circumstances Test 
to Heightened Standard of Review Clauses, 45 B.C. L. REv. 943, 947 (2004) ("(J]udicial 
integrity is enhanced when courts apply uniform analytical frameworks consistently."). 
246. Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1249 (Ala. 1 998). 
247. Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 634-35 (Conn. 2005). 
248. 
[W]e learn from an early age to defer to the authority of parents and established 
institutions . . . .  We do not entirely lose that tendency when we grow up to be judges 
who decide cases . . . . The less time we have to decide a case . . . the more pressure 
there is to decide quickly and we may be less likely to analyze and reflect on the 
condition and circumstances of the individual's case . . . . Such cases can become a 
ritual in which the court searches quickly for a legal defense . . . without seriously 
contemplating possible injustices to the individual party or other members of the 
community. The need for haste may make the court search for "safe" rather than just 
decisions and may push the process toward ritual rather than reflection. 
Merritt, supra note 244, at 1394-95. 
249. Mo lot, supra note 242, at 1322. 
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instead, on a false civil law-common law dichotomy hinders judicial 
transparency, and thus judicial integrity. 
2. Properly Characterizing the Difference Between the Common 
and Civil Law Systems 
Many, both inside and outside the realm of the civil law world, 
envision a major distinction between civil and common law systems. 
Volumes could be, and have been, devoted to exposition of these 
di:fferences.250 Yet our view of the gulf is becoming increasingly 
nuanced in the twenty-first century. As common law systems become 
more systematized251 and civil law systems more focused on 
jurisprudence as an authoritative source of law,252 the two systems are 
coming together more closely than one might guess. There certainly 
remain many differences between the systems, but they are less stark 
today than they once were. 
The Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Jtehby and the 
Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Buccino, along with other 
appellate opinions, are perpetuating an error of law that is outdated in 
this new world. It encourages the common misconception that the gap 
between the systems lies in their divergent substantive treatment of 
particular legal issues. That is a position I find untenable today. 
Some recent scholarly commentary strives to explain the 
difference between common and civil law systems as one of differing 
priorities, or different moral and philosophical bents. For example, 
one writer remarked, in attempting to describe Louisiana's "mixed" 
common and civil law system,253 that it "places more emphasis on the 
rights of individuals as opposed to government."254 Likewise, another 
scholar speaks of divergent "souls" or "spirits" in the two systems.255 
250. A full discussion of these disparities is beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
good explanation of some of the differences, and a recognition of the complexity and 
impossibility of thoroughly addressing them in a work of any length, see JOHN HENRY 
MERRYMAN, THE CNIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF 
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 149-50 (2d ed. 1985). What follows, then, is an 
intentionally simplistic discussion, more focused on what the differences are not than on what 
they are. 
25 1 .  The promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is but one example 
of the common law's increasing systematization. For an excellent comparison of the UCC to 
''true" civilian codes, see William D. Hawkland, The Um'fonn Commercial Code and the 
Civil Codes, 56 LA. L. REv. 23 1 ,  23 1 -47 (1995). 
252. See Palmer, supra note 243, at 1 1 18 n. 148. 
253 . See Smith, supra note 3, at 10. 
254. Steven Frederic Lachman, Should Mumcipalities Be Liable for Development­
Rclated Flooding?, 4 1  NAT. RESOURCES J. 945, 952 n.22 (2001 ) . 
255. Robert A. Pascal, Low'siana Civil Law and Its Study, 60 LA. L. REv. I ,  3 ( 1999). 
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The "soul of the modem civil law" is said to be "dedicated to liberty, 
equality, and fratemity."256 On the other hand, Robert Pascal wrote: 
The Common Law . . .  seems . . .  to be very differently oriented. I see it 
dominated even in this day by two factors, one its feudal origins, which 
continue to be manifest strongly in the law of property . . .  and the other, 
its original sole other concern, that of providing such redress or remedy 
as was necessary to maintain . . .  peace, or to obviate civil disorder, 
rather than of articulating an order for the maximum securing of 
freedom, dignity, and cooperation. Each of these factors has resulted in 
the Common Law's failure to respect human dignity, freedom, and 
equality in the same degree as the civil law, and the second has resulted 
in a failure of the Common Law to give as much respect to cooperative 
action.257 
Beyond the "soul" of the systems, scholars often argue a 
fundamental distinction in substantive rules. A common law attorney 
with considerable knowledge of the civil law remarked in the 1 950s, 
for example, that "the leading differences" between the common and 
civil law systems are not differences in sources of law or 
methodologies, "but in the concepts themselves."258 
The sphere of real property, in particular, is one in which the civil 
law and common law systems are alleged to differ substantially. 259 The 
divergence in the substantive rules of property between the two 
systems-as is the divergence in fundamental values or philosophy (or 
more metaphorically, if you prefer, "spirit or soul"}-is greatly 
exaggerated. The gulf is viewed as so deep that it has prompted the 
observation that "the civil law of property, which does have an internal 
logic . . .  does not easily correspond to anything known in the complex 
common law of property, with its 'veritable jungle of concepts."'260 
256. Id 
257. Id at 3-4. 
258. LAWSON, supm note 173, at 209. 
259. See Ottavio Campanella, The Italian Legal Profession, 1 9  J. LEGAL PROF. 59, 60 
( 1994) ("The similarities between the civil-law systems and their differences with common­
law systems are especially marked in . . . the classifications and rules of what is traditionally 
private law, having to do with . . .  property . . . .  " (quoting ALAN WATSON, THE MAK.ING OF 
CIVIL LAW 1 ( 198 1))); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in 
Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L R.Ev. L. & ECON. 3,  9 ( 1994) (Property is "an area 
of the law where most of the notable differences between the common law and the civil law 
can be found."); Michael J. Reppas II, The Deflowenng of the Parthenon: A Legal and Moral 
Analysis on JWJy the "Elgin Marbles" Must Be Retumed to Greece, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 9 1 1 ,  94 7-48 n.204 ( 1 999) ("The rules on property in a common law 
country are vastly different from those of a 'civil Jaw' country . . . .  "). 
260. Jacques du Plessis, Common Law Influences on the Law of Contract and 
Unjustified Emichment in Some Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. R.Ev. 2 19, 249 (2003). 
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A historical look at the single legal concept presented in this 
Article-that of riparian landowner access to the surface of 
nonnavigable water bodies-is a useful exercise in comparison. It is 
just one of many concepts for which comparative historical study 
serves to counter the myths about the differences between the common 
law and the civil law. In fact, neither the substance of the private law 
rule, nor the evidence of the "spirit" of the rule, evinces differs across 
traditions. 
The substance of this riparian landowner rule is the same in both 
the civil and common law traditions. Indeed, the rule used by both 
"camps" was drawn from the same source. The rule of civil law 
systems, cqjus est solum, then, does "easily correspond" to something 
in the common law; the rule of the "veritable jungle" that is the 
common law is also the civilian-born cujus est solwn! In an area in 
which the common and civil law systems are widely viewed to differ 
substantially, a comparison of this riparian landowner access rule, at 
least, tends to show the opposite.261 Close study of the development of 
other civilian and Anglo-American legal concepts often will, I believe, 
remind us of how "the same problems have occupied us all on both 
sides of the channel; how our methodology has often been different 
and how, despite the preceding observation, our final results have, 
invariably, been analogous."262 The difference between the common 
and the civil laws is "more than a set of different legal rules."263 
Emphasis of this point is one small step toward showing that the 
substantial difference between the common and civil law systems is 
likewise not one of differing souls or spirits, at least not as that soul or 
spirit is measured by the systems' respective commitment to values 
such as fraternity, human dignity, freedom, and equality. This example 
suggests that both systems rank those values identically. Fraternity and 
freedom (which would presumably favor a rule allowing free access to 
all neighboring riparian landowners) must yield to traditional notions 
surrounding the landowner's right to exclusive dominion over his 
261 .  This is not to say, of course, that differences in the substantive rules of property 
across systems do not exist. They, of course, do. For a detailed comparison of particular 
rules of property in both systems, see James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth 
Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1 8 15, 1859-69 (2000). 
262. Basil Markesinis, Two Hundred }fats of a Famous Code: Mat Should Vli' Be 
Celebrating?, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 56 1 ,  564 (2004). 
263. MERRYMAN, supra note 250, at 150. 
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property. Neither system, in this context, fosters greater "cooperative 
action." Both systems place an equal premium on individual rights.264 
Are there substantial differences across systems? Absolutely. I 
submit, though, that the differences are not often in substance or in 
striking different balances with respect to the above-described values. 
A detailed exploration of such purported differences often shows them 
to be "more false than true."265 I believe the more important 
differences between the common and civil law systems are "subtler . . .  
d . ,,266 an more pervasive. 
Shifting the focus away :from rumored substantive differences that 
do not, in fact, exist will allow us to study and benefit :from these truly 
substantial differences. Two hundred years after the creation of a rule 
of :free riparian landowner access, it is time to acknowledge the source 
of the rule, or more particularly, that there is no civil law rule which 
departs from a common law rule. The civil law and common law 
nomenclature, at least as it relates to the substantive rules of riparian 
landowner surface access, creates the mirage of a gulf between the 
systems, when in fact no such gulf is present. It does us a disservice, 
and for that, should be abandoned. 
264. See Julian Hermida, Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law Contracts in 
the Space Field, 34 H.K.L.J. 339, 343 (2004) ("Both . . .  (systems] share similar fundamental 
social objectives, which include the protection and encouragement of individual and personal 
rights and are both enrolled in a liberal philosophy and conception of the world."). 
265. See Danielle Conway-Jones, Mongolia, Law Convergence, and the Third Era of 
Globalization, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 63, 7 1  (2004). 
266. See MERRYMAN, supra note 250, at 1 50 (describing the historical and cultural 
dim�nsions of the differences). Specifically, I believe the true differences are of style, 
temunology, and a philosophy of how law is best articulated and responsive to change. See 
Hermida, supra note 264, at 343. 
